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1. INTRODUCTION
In a sale of goods, a seller may expressly or impliedly warrant that
the goods have certain physical qualities, such as being free from defects
in manufacturing.' Although enforcing these warranties may not be prob-
lematical while the goods are in the hands of the immediate purchaser,
that is, the buyer who bought directly from the seller, invoking the war-
ranties may be considerably more difficult, if not impossible, when the
goods have been sold to a remote buyer who seeks to enforce such guar-
antees. The problem confronting a remote purchaser is exemplified by
Daughtry v. Jet Aeration Co. 2 In that case, James Daughtry purchased a
home sewage treatment system manufactured by Jet Aeration Co. for use
with a new house he was constructing.3 Three years after installing the
system, Daughtry encountered difficulties with the system, including
water backing up into the system's chambers. After a number of attempts
to correct the problems, including the provision of a new agitation unit
by Jet Aeration, Daughtry sued Jet Aeration for breach of warranty. 4 De-
spite trial court findings that Jet Aeration breached both express and im-
* Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. The author expresses his appreciation to Eliot
Harris, Russel Robertson, and Christopher Wyant for their research assistance on this article.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 22-25, 34-36, 143-149.
2.91 Wash. 2d 704, 705-06, 592 P.2d 631, 631-32 (1979).
3. Id.
4. Id. Daughtry also named a Jet Aeration distributor as a defendant but did not name the indi-
vidual from whom he purchased the system. The case offers no explanation for Daughtry's failure to
sue the immediate seller for breach of warranty.
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plied warranties pertaining to the proper functioning of the treatment sys-
tem, Daughtry was unable to enforce the warranties against Jet Aeration
because he did not purchase the system directly from the manufacturer
and therefore lacked a contractual relationship with it. 5 Instead, Daughtry
was relegated to his rights under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, which enables a purchaser who suffers a loss from nonconforming
goods to obtain a remedy for breach of warranty from the entity that sold
it the goods. 6
Although a remote buyer, such as Daughtry, may have a remedy
against its immediate seller, there are instances in which it may be more
beneficial for a buyer to obtain relief from a more remote seller in the
chain of distribution, one with whom the buyer is not in privity of con-
5. Id. at 711, 592 P.2d at 634.
6. U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-314, 2-315 (2001). Unless otherwise noted, all citations to sections in
Article 11 are to the sections as they existed prior to the 2003 amendments to that article.
Section 2-313 provides for the creation of an express warranty when a seller either makes an
affirmation, promise or description that relates to the goods sold or provides a sample or model of
the goods if the representation becomes part of the basis of the bargain between the seller and a
buyer.
Section 2-3 14 provides that there is an implied warranty in a contract for the sales of goods that
the goods shall be merchantable when the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of the kind sold.
Section 2-315 provides that a warranty of fitness for particular purpose is implied in a contract for
the sale of goods when a seller has reason to know of any particular purpose for which the goods are
required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable
goods.
Two limitations exist on a buyer's right to enforce a warranty against a seller. The first is the
parol evidence rule, as provided in section 2-202. Pursuant to this rule, evidence of a prior agreement
or a contemporaneous oral agreement may not be introduced to contradict the terms of a writing
intended by parties as a final expression of their agreement and may not be introduced to supplement
the agreement with consistent additional terms if the writing was intended as a complete and exclu-
sive embodiment of the parties' agreement. See, e.g., Betaco, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 103 F.3d
1281, 1292-93 (7th Cir. 1996) (writing, including disclaimer, complete integration barring antece-
dent warranty); Allmand Assocs., Inc. v. Hercules Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1216, 1229-30 (E.D. Mich.
1997); Ray Martin Painting, Inc. v. Ameron, Inc., 638 F.Supp. 768, 772-73 (D.Kan. 1986); Kelmar
v. Mi-Michigan Freightliner, Inc., 52 U.C.C. Rep Serv 2d 411,412 (Mich. App. 2003). See infra text
accompanying notes 131-139 for a discussion of the parol evidence rule as it applies to remote seller
representations made directly to remote buyers. The other limitation is found in section 2-316, which
allows a seller to modify or disclaim implied warranties. So long as a seller complies with the re-
quirements of section 2-316, a seller can disclaim either an implied warranty of merchantability or
an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Washington law, however, requires that any
warranty disclaimer be individually negotiated between the seller and buyer. See, e.g., Cox v. Lewis-
ton Grain Growers, Inc., 86 Wash. App. 357, 365, 936 P.2d 1191, 1196 (1997); Schroeder v. Fageol
Motors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 256, 257-59, 544 P.2d 20, 22-23 (1975); Dobias v. Western Farmers
Ass'n,, 6 Wash. App. 194, 199, 491 P.2d 1346, 1350 (1971). For an economic analysis of the indi-
vidual negotiation rule, see Thomas J. Holdych & George Ferrell, Individual Negotiation of War-
ranty Disclaimers: An Economic Analysis of an Assumedly Market Enhancing Rule, 13 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 237 (1990). Where the transaction involves the sale of goods for consumer purposes,
Washington's version of section 2-3 16 requires that the disclaimer set forth with particularity the
attributes being disclaimed. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-316(4) (1982).
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tract. For example, the immediate seller may have become insolvent 7 or
otherwise be unavailable. 8 The buyer may have failed to give its immedi-
ate seller notice of breach of warranty, barring the buyer from any rem-
edy against the seller.9 In addition, the contract of sale between the buyer
and the immediate seller may have contained a disclaimer of warranty °
or remedy limitation," precluding or limiting any remedy against the
seller.'2 Finally, the remote supplier may have offered a more extensive
express warranty, or a potential class action may be available against a
remote supplier.' 3
Despite these potential advantages for a remote purchaser, the pro-
visions of Article 2 pertaining to warranties indicate, with one excep-
tion,' 4 that there must be privity of contract 5 between a buyer and seller
7. See Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 78 (Tex. 1977) (immediate seller out of
business); Morrow v. New Moon Homes, 548 P.2d 279, 282 (Alaska 1976) (immediate seller out of
business).
8. See Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 307 (N.J. 1965) (immediate seller
left jurisdiction and unavailable for suit); Richard E. Speidel, Warranty Theory, Economic Loss, and
the Privity Requirement: Once More Into the Void, 67 B.U. L. REV. 9, 37 (1987).
9. U.C.C. § 2-607(3) (2001). By its terms, this section does not require a seller to prove that it
was prejudiced by a buyer's failure to give timely notice in order to invoke the measure's protection.
See Aqualon Co. v. MAC Equip., Inc., 149 F.3d 262, 270 (4th Cir. 1998) (prejudice relevant to
reasonable time for notice but not required to invoke the section); Armco Steel Corp. v. lsaacson
Structural Steel, Co., 611 P.2d 507, 510-15 (Alaska 1980); but see Boyes v. Greenwich Boat Works,
Inc., 27 F.Supp.2d 543, 551-52 (D.N.J. 1998) (prejudice from delay required). The notice require-
ment applies to consumer, as well as commercial, transactions. See Hebron v. American lsuzu Mo-
tors, Inc., 60 F.3d 1095, 1098 (4th Cir. 1995).
10. See Speidel, supra note 8, at 37. Section 2-316(2)-(3) provides several methods by which a
seller can disclaim an implied warranty, for example, by using language such as "as is."
11. See Speidel, supra note 8, at 37. Section 2-719 allows parties to an agreement to provide
for remedies in addition to or in substitution for those in the Code.
12. It is common for sellers of new automobiles to disclaim the implied warranty of merchant-
ability and not make any express warranties, leaving buyers with express warranties or repair agree-
ments provided by manufacturers as the sole bases for claims for nonconformities or for a remedy.
See Donald F. Clifford, Express Warranty Liability of Remote Sellers: One Purchase, Two Relation-
ships, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 413, 444 (1997); JOHN 0. HONNOLD ET AL., THE LAW OF SALES AND SE-
CURED FINANCING 290-91 (6th ed. 1993).
13. See Metowski v. Traid Corp., 104 Cai.Rptr. 599 (Cal. App. 1972) (class action for breach
of express warranty); Ysbrand v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., 81 P.3d 618 (Okla. 2003) (express war-
ranty); Smith v. Behr Process Corp., 113 Wash. App. 306, 54 P.3d 665 (2002) (express warranty and
implied warranty of merchantability). But see Hazelhurst v. Brita Prod. Co., 744 N.Y.S.2d 31, 34
(2002) (class certification denied for express warranty claims where individual issues of reliance
predominated); Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d 675, 694 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 2003) (certifi-
cation denied because individual issues of reliance predominated).
14. Certain individuals are third-party beneficiaries of a seller's warranty to its buyer. U.C.C. §
2-318 (2003). A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of U.C.C. section 2-318, which confers
this third-party beneficiary status. There are three alternatives to section 2-318, the first of which,
Alternative A, is the most restrictive. It limits third-party beneficiary status to any natural person
who is a family or household member or guest of the purchaser who may be expected to be affected
by the good in question and who suffers personal injury as a result of a breach of warranty. U.C.C. §
2-318, alt. A. The State of Washington has adopted this version. See WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-318
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in order for the buyer to assert an obligation with respect to the attributes
of the goods against the seller.' 6 Nevertheless, buyers have sought to ex-
pand the class of sellers against whom they can proceed.
(1965). Although a seller may not preclude third-party beneficiary rights under section 2-318 if it
makes a warranty to a buyer, the section does not preclude a seller from refusing to give an express
warranty or from disclaiming an implied warranty under section 2-316, in which case there is no
warranty of which a third party can be a beneficiary. See U.C.C. § 2-318, cmt. 1. Importantly for
present purposes, section 2-318 Alternative A deals only with horizontal privity issues, those in
which the person seeking to enforce a warranty is one who uses or is affected by a good but not one
who is a subsequent purchaser from the immediate buyer. See WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-318:2 ALTERNATIVE A (2002); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUM-
MERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1 I-1 (5th ed. 2000). Alternative A does not deal with or
affect case law concerning vertical privity, cases involving suppliers and remote buyers. U.C.C. § 2-
318, cmt. 3; WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, supra, § 2-318:1: Horizontal, Vertical, and Diagonal Privity
Limitations on Warranty Recovery; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra, § 11-3. Section 2-318 of the 2003
amendments to Article 2 contains three alternatives concerning third-party beneficiaries of warran-
ties that are comparable to those in the unamended section. The major difference between the two
sections is that the revision applies not only to a seller's warranty to an immediate buyer but also to a
seller's obligation to a remote buyer under new sections 2-313A and 2-313B. U.C.C. § 2-318. See
infra note 104.
15. The seminal case establishing the privity of contract requirement is Winterbottom v.
Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). There a coachman was employed by an individual who had a
contract to deliver mail for the postmaster general. Id. The coachman alleged he was injured when a
coach he was driving, which the postmaster general had contracted to have maintained by the defen-
dant, broke down as a result of the defendant's negligent maintenance. Id. at 403. In an opinion
supporting dismissal of the coachman's case against the defendant for negligence in the performance
of his contract with the postmaster general, Lord Abinger said:
There is no privity of contract between these parties; and if the plaintiff can sue, every
passenger, or even any person passing along the road, who was injured by the upsetting
of the coach, might bring a similar action. Unless we confine the operation of such con-
tracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous conse-
quences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue.
Id. at 405.
16. An express warranty is created by a "seller" when, in part, the seller makes an affirmation
or promise to the "buyer." U.C.C. § 2-313 (2001). A buyer is one who buys or contracts to buy
goods, U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(a), and a seller is one who sells or contracts to sell goods, U.C.C. § 2-
103(l)(d). Section 2-106(1) defines a contract for the sale of goods and is based on the definition of
contract in section 1-201(b)(12), which means the total legal obligation of the parties' agreement.
(Citations to Article I are to that article as amended in 2001.) The latter term, "agreement," means
the parties' bargain in fact. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(3) (2001). Thus it is the buyer under a contract to
whom a seller makes an express warranty and not someone outside the contractual relationship. See
Curtis R. Reitz, Manufacturers' Warranties of Consumer Goods, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 360-61
(1997).
A warranty that goods shall be merchantable is implied in a "contract for their sale" if the
"seller" is a merchant with respect to goods of the kind being sold. U.C.C. § 2-314. Both the re-
quirement for a "contract for sale," which is defined in section 2-106(1), and the "seller" require-
ment indicate that there must be a contract between the party seeking to enforce the warranty and his
warrantor, and that the warrantor must be his seller. See Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 107 Wash. 2d
127, 150-53, 727 P.2d 655, 668-69 (1986); Reitz, supra, at 368.
Similarly, section 2-315, which provides for a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose,
provides that the "seller" at the time of "contracting" must have reason to know any particular pur-
pose for which the goods are being required and that the "buyer" is relying on the "seller's" skill or
judgment to select or furnish suitable goods. Again, use of the terms "seller," "buyer," and "contract-
Remote Purchasers
In confronting these attempts by remote buyers, Washington courts
have, with limited exceptions, 17 continued to adhere to the privity re-
quirement. In the recent case of Tex Enterprises, Inc. v. Brockway Stan-
dard, Inc.,1 8 for example, the Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed ex-
isting Washington law that a purchaser must be in privity of contract
with a seller to maintain an action for breach of implied warranty of mer-
chantability. The court also indicated, however, that privity is not a bar-
rier to a claim for breach of express warranty when a seller makes a di-
rect representation about its goods to a remote purchaser. The Tex Enter-
prises, Inc. case and others preceding it19 raise a number of questions
concerning the enforceability of express and implied warranties against
remote sellers.
The purpose of this article is to examine Washington law pertaining
to a seller's obligations to a remote purchaser with respect to the quality
of goods, attending in particular to the judicially created exceptions to
the privity requirement. 20 Part II explores the reasons a seller may pro-
vide and a buyer may purchase a warranty, reasons that bear on resolu-
tion of the question whether the privity requirement should be retained.
Parts III and IV analyze not only what warranty obligations a seller may
have to a remote purchaser but also the theoretical bases for those obliga-
tions and the manner in which those obligations may be excluded, modi-
fied, or disclaimed. Part V considers a number of arguments in favor of
abolishing the privity requirement and demonstrates that the arguments
do not merit the requirement's abrogation and that privity of contract is
appropriate for a proper allocation of loss among a seller, its immediate
buyer, and a remote buyer. Finally, the article concludes that seller liabil-
ity to a remote buyer should exist, subject to the ability of a seller to cre-
ate contractual rights in a remote buyer under U.C.C. section 1-103(b),21
only where the seller has made an express commitment to the buyer or
ing" clearly denote the existence of a contractual or privity relationship between the warrantor and
the person to whom the warranty is given. See Baughn, 107 Wash. 2d at 150-53, 727 P.2d at 668-
69.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 58-84 and 155-161.
18. 149 Wash. 2d 204, 66 P.3d 625 (2003).
19. See, e.g., Touchet Valley Grain Growers, Inc. v. Opp & Seibold Gen. Constr., Inc., 119
Wash. 2d 334, 343-51, 831 P.2d 724, 729-32 (1992); Baughn, 107 Wash. 2d at 150-53, 727 P.2d at
668-69; Lidstrand v. Silvercrest Indus., 28 Wash. App. 359, 623 P.2d 710 (1981); Schroeder v.
Fageol Motors, Inc., 12 Wash. App. 161, 528 P.2d 992 (1974) rev'don other grounds, 86 Wash. 2d
256, 544 P.2d 20 (1975).
20. The article does not deal with privity issues arising out of claims for personal injury except
to the extent recovery is sought based on a breach of warranty. See, e.g., Baughn, 107 Wash. 2d at
668-69, 727 P.2d at 668-69. Personal injury claims not based on breach of warranty are governed
by WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.30, which requires no privity between a manufacturer and an injured
claimant for injury caused by a defective product.
21. See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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where the remote buyer is a third-party beneficiary of a contract of sale
between the remote seller and its intermediate buyer under established
contract principles. Consistent with this conclusion, the article further
maintains that the ability of a seller to make an express warranty to a re-
mote buyer should be enhanced by eliminating the requirement that a
buyer be aware of a representation prior to purchase in order to be able to
enforce the representation as an express warranty.
II. THE EXISTENCE OF WARRANTIES
Two kinds of warranty obligations exist that pertain to the attributes
of goods:22 express and implied. Express warranties are part of the ex-
press or "dickered" terms between the parties to an agreement. 23 Implied
warranties, on the other hand, are default obligations 24 supplied by the
law to supplement the express terms between the parties25 absent dis-
claimer or modification.
Why a seller will either include an express warranty or not disclaim
an implied warranty is an important question. Warranties impose costs
on a seller by requiring it to assure that its goods conform to its represen-
tations or commitments and, if they do not, by requiring it to provide a
buyer with an appropriate remedy. 6 Such costs are included in the price
paid by a buyer.
22. In a contract for the sale of goods, a seller warrants that title to the goods shall be good, that
their transfer shall be rightful, and that the goods shall be delivered free of any security interest or
encumbrance of which the buyer had no knowledge at the time of contracting. U.C.C. § 2-312
(1999).
23. See id. § 2-313, cmt. 1. Express warranties are part of the parties' agreement or bargain in
fact, U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(3) (2001), as opposed to simply provisions of their contract, which includes
obligations supplied by the law, id. § 1-201(b)(12).
24. Default terms or obligations are provisions supplied by the law in the absence of agreement
by the parties. They are not mandatory obligations such as that in section 1-304, which requires
parties to perform contract and Code duties in good faith, since the default terms are subject to modi-
fication or elimination by the parties to an agreement. For discussions of default terms see Robert
Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEG. STUD. 597 (1990);
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L. J. 87 (1989).
25. Unlike express warranties, implied warranties are not part of the parties' agreement or
bargain in fact, U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(3), but are part of their contract, which means the total legal obli-
gation resulting from the parties agreement as determined by the Code and other applicable law, id. §
1-201(b)(12). U.C.C. §§ 2-314 and 2-315 provide for implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness for a particular purpose absent disclaimer by the parties.
26. A buyer's remedies for breach of warranty consist of rejection, U.C.C. § 2-601, or revoca-
tion of acceptance of the goods, U.C.C. § 2-608, together with an action for market damages, U.C.C.
§§ 2-712, 2-713. If the buyer retains the goods, the buyer may bring an action for the difference, at
the time of acceptance, between the value of the goods as accepted and the value the goods would
have had if they had conformed to the warranty, together with incidental and consequential damages,
U.C.C. § 2-714. In addition to this liability, a seller confronting a breach of warranty claim also faces
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Two competing theories attempt to explain a seller's decision to
make or to not disclaim a warranty. According to the signaling theory, an
express warranty provides to a buyer a signal about the quality of a prod-
uct.2 7 Absent a warranty, a buyer would either have to make assumptions
about a product's quality or incur costs in ascertaining information about
its quality.2 s When a buyer's information costs are high, it may have to
assume either the worst or that a product is of average quality.2 9 For a
seller who offers a product of above average quality or reliability, a war-
ranty gives the buyer that information. A seller with such a product will
give a more extensive warranty, since a warranty for a better quality or
more reliable product is less costly to provide, involving lower remedy
costs because of fewer nonconformities. 30 The warranty, then, acts as a
signal to consumers about the condition of the product and gives some
degree of insurance for failure.31
According to the comparative advantage theory, a seller will war-
rant that a good has certain attributes when a buyer values those attrib-
utes more than the cost of providing them or of insuring against losses
resulting from their absence, and the seller can provide the attributes or
insurance more cheaply than the buyer can.32 Thus, if a buyer prefers a
inspection and dispute resolution costs to determine whether there was a breach of warranty and
error costs resulting from erroneous decisions that a good failed to conform to a warranty.
27. See generally, Nancy A. Lutz, Warranties as Signals Under Consumer Moral Hazard, 20
RAND J. ECON. 239 (1989) (examining the use of prices and warranties as signals of product qual-
ity).
28. Id. at 248-49.
29. The buyer's assumptions are related to the "lemons" problem formulated by George Aker-
loff, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488
(1970). According to Akerloff, a market failure will occur if there are differences in quality among
goods of the same kind, and sellers know the quality of their goods, but buyers do not. Id. at 490.
Buyers will assume that any particular item in the market will be of average quality and only pay a
price based on that assumption. Since the average quality will be below that of better quality goods,
sellers of those goods will withdraw them from the market since the market price will be lower than
the cost of providing the higher quality good. Sellers of lower quality goods, however, will have an
incentive to sell their goods since the market price exceeds their cost. As more low quality goods are
brought to market, the average quality of goods in the market will fall together with their price. The
market will continue to fall until no sellers remain because of the inability of buyers to ascertain the
quality of goods. Id. Express warranties provide a solution to this "lemons" problem by conveying
information about product quality in the market. Id. at 499.
30. George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1303
(1981).
31. The signaling theory implies that similar products that vary in quality will offer different
warranties; the better the quality the more extensive the warranty coverage. ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 425 (1988). For many products, however, warranty terms
from different manufacturers are identical despite differences in quality, leading some to conclude
that the signaling theory is not well supported by empirical facts. Id.
32. Priest, supra note 30, at 1308 (finding consumer will purchase repairs from seller when
seller's price is less than cost of consumer providing repairs).
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product free from defects in manufacturing more than the cost of provid-
ing such a product, and the seller can provide the defect-free attribute or
insure against losses resulting from the attribute's absence more cheaply
than the buyer can, the seller will provide a warranty against defects in
manufacturing to the buyer.33
II. EXPRESS WARRANTY OBLIGATIONS TO REMOTE BUYERS
A. The Uniform Commercial Code
As indicated above, 34 U.C.C. section 2-313 provides that a seller
creates an express warranty concerning the quality of the goods it sells
when it promises that the goods will have certain attributes, describes the
goods in a particular manner, or provides the buyer with a model or sam-
ple of the goods. By its terms, section 2-313 deals only with an affirma-
tion or description made by a seller to its buyer. 35 Section 2-313 does not
pertain to a representation made by a seller to an entity with whom the
seller is not in privity of contract. 36 Section 2-318, however, does extend
an express warranty to certain designated third-party beneficiaries, but
not to a remote buyer.37
33. Professor George L. Priest's study of express warranties confirming the comparative ad-
vantage theory was conducted of manufacturers' express warranties to remote, consumer buyers. See
Priest, supra note 30, at 1319. The warranties were made in transactions in which there was no priv-
ity between the manufacturers and intended purchasers.
34. U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-314, 2-315.
35. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. Such an affirmation can, of course, be made
through an agent. Thus, if a contract between a remote seller and its distributor creates an agency
relationship in the sale of the goods in question, there is privity between the remote seller and the
remote buyer. See, e.g., Thompson Farms, Inc. v. Como Feed Prods., 366 N.E.2d 3, 10 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1977); Alberti v. Manufactured Homes, Inc., 407 S.E.2d 819, 825 (N.C. 1991) (manufacturer
made representations to be communicated to remote buyers); Bobb Forest Prod., Inc. v. Mobark
Indus., 783 N.E.2d 560, 576 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (manufacturer so involved in sale transaction that
distributor mere agent); Gaha v. Taylor-Johnson Dodge, Inc., 632 P.2d 483, 486 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
36. By contrast, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1975), which
provides for the creation and enforcement of designated express written warranties or repair obliga-
tions, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6), does not require privity of contract between a warrantor who makes such
an express warranty or repair commitment and a consumer. See Abraham v. Volkswagen of Amer-
ica, Inc., 795 F.2d 238, 247-49 (2d Cir. 1986). Similarly, WASH. REV. CODE § 19.118.041 (1987),
the Washington "Lemon Law," requires an automobile manufacturer that makes a warranty to a
consumer and fails to conform a vehicle to the warranty within a reasonable number of attempts to
repurchase the vehicle or to provide the consumer with a replacement vehicle. This obligation exists
despite a lack of privity of contract between the manufacturer and the consumer. See, e.g., Chrysler
Motors Corp. v. Flowers, 116 Wash. 2d 208, 803 P.2d 314 (1991); Ford Motor Co. v. Barrett, 115
Wash. 2d 556, 800 P.2d 367 (1990).
37. See supra note 14. A seller's warranty can be extended to any person who may reasonably
be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods and is injured by a breach of the warranty.
U.C.C. § 2-318, alt. C (1966). Under the language of this alternative, a remote buyer may qualify as
one expected to use or be affected by a remote seller's goods and subject to injury if there is a breach
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B. Common Law Principles and Obligations to Remote Buyers
The only basis in the U.C.C., outside of section 2-3 18, for allowing
what might appear 38 to be a nonprivity entity to claim an obligation to it
by a remote seller is section 1-103(b). 39 That section provides that the
principles of law and equity, including the law of estoppel, supplement
the provisions of the Code. The doctrine of promissory estoppel provides
that a promise that a promisor should realize will induce action or for-
bearance on the part of the promisee or a third person, and which does
induce such conduct, is binding if enforcement of the promise is neces-
sary to avoid injustice.40 Thus, if a remote seller makes a promise to a
remote buyer realizing, for example, that the buyer may rely on the
promise to purchase goods supplied by the remote seller, the latter's
promise should be enforceable by the remote buyer if breach of the
promise imposes a loss on the remote buyer.4 ' Of course, to invoke the
doctrine a remote purchaser needs to have known of a remote seller's
warranty prior to purchasing the goods or engage in other behavior that
makes the warranty enforceable.42
In addition to promissory estoppel, common law contract principles
on unilateral contracts may provide for an enforceable warranty by a re-
mote seller. In Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., a manufacturer of-
fered a reward to anyone who contracted influenza after using its smoke
ball, a medicinal device sold as a preventive against disease.43 The court
held that a remote purchaser of a ball who contracted influenza could
enforce the promised reward since the manufacturer made her and other
consumers an offer of a unilateral contract, the acceptance of the offer
of warranty. See Reitz, supra note 16, at 369-70; HAWKLAND, supra note 14, § 2-318:2 ALTERNA-
TIVE C. Alternative A, adopted in the State of Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-318, is re-
stricted to parties in horizontal privity with the original purchaser.
38. Although the two warranties discussed in the text appear to be ones where there is no priv-
ity of contract, there is actually privity in both instances. In both, the warranty is made to the pro-
misee and enforceable because of either estoppel or a bargained-for exchange.
39. "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of [the Uniform Commercial Code], the
principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract,
principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, and
other validating or invalidating cause supplement its provisions." U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (2001).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
41. See Millar H. Ruud, Manufacturer's Liability for Representations Made by Their Sales
Engineers to Subpurchasers, 8 UCLA L. REV. 251, 272-73 (1961).
42. Under the Restatement of Contracts, a promise must induce the action or forbearance
which is part of the basis for imposing liability on the promisor. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 90.
43. [1893] I Q.B. 256, 257 (1892). See Clifford, supra note 12, at 426; Harry M. Fletcher,
Enforcing Manufacturers' Warranties, "Pass-Through" Warranties and the Like: Can the Buyer
Get a Refund? 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 397, 453-54 (1998) (manufacturer notices and advertisements
constitute offers to provide warranty protection in exchange for purchasing product from retail
dealer).
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and the consideration for the promise consisting of the remote pur-
chaser's using the ball.44 Similarly, a remote buyer might establish that a
remote seller offered a warranty in exchange for the buyer's engaging in
certain action, most likely purchasing the good from an immediate seller.
Although the unilateral contract theory is theoretically appropriate for
remote seller representations where it is at least reasonably implicit that
the seller is bargaining for the remote buyer's behavior, the court's ap-
proach in Carlill appears to have been infrequently cited in warranty
cases. 45 Moreover, a remote buyer probably would find it difficult to es-
tablish a unilateral contract where the warranty is an affirmation of fact 46
or a description of a good,47 instead of a promise as in Carlill, or where a
warranty accompanies a product and the buyer might not discover the
warranty until after purchasing the good.48
C. The Privity Requirement for Express Warranties and
Its Exceptions in Washington Case Law
At least until recently, the general rule in Washington has been that
privity of contract must exist between a warrantor and a person seeking
to enforce an express warranty. Application of the general rule is most
aptly demonstrated by two cases: Dimoff v. Ernie Majer, Inc.49 and
Daughtry v. Jet Aeration Co. 50 In Dimoff the plaintiffs purchased a truck
from a dealer. The written purchase agreement between the dealer and
the plaintiffs contained the dealer's express warranty against defects and
referred the purchasers to a Ford Motor Co. warranty on the back of the
writing, a warranty apparently intended for remote purchasers. 51 When
the truck was found to have a crimped fuel line that caused the vehicle to
perform poorly, the plaintiffs, in addition to suing the dealer for fraud
and breach of warranty, brought an action against Ford for breach of ex-
press warranty. 2 Finding no exceptions to the general rule,53 the court
44. [1893] 1 Q.B. 256, 261-75 (1892). Although the court found consideration in the use of the
ball, some authorities indicate that the manufacturer was bargaining for purchase of the balls from
third party sellers. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 135 n.34 (4th ed. 2004); JOHN 0. HON-
NOLD ET AL., THE LAW OF SALES AND SECURED FINANCING 296 (7th ed. 2001).
45. See Clifford, supra note 12, at 426.
46. U.C.C § 2-313(a) (2001).
47. Id.
48. See Ruud, supra note 41, at 269-71. The author received a gift with a warranty card that
simply instructed the purchaser or user to visit a designated website to discover the terms of the
manufacturer's express warranty. Needless to say, it is doubtful that many consumers either carry
computers with them to access a website prior to purchase or incur the transaction costs of finding a
computer and reading the terms on the website prior to buying the product.
49. 55 Wash. 2d 385, 347 P.2d 1056 (1960).
50. 91 Wash. 2d 704, 592 P.2d 631 (1979).
51. Dimoff 55 Wash. 2d at 385, 347 P.2d at 1056.
52. Id. at 387, 347 P.2d at 1058.
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upheld the trial court's dismissal of the action against Ford because of an
absence of privity of contract. 54
Similarly, as discussed at the beginning of this article,55 the plaintiff
in Daughtry purchased a home sewage treatment system manufactured
by the defendant and subsequently encountered problems with the sys-
tem that the defendant, among others, failed to correct. In an action for
breach of warranty against the manufacturer, the Washington Supreme
Court, over a vigorous dissent,56 held that the plaintiffs claim against the
manufacturer was barred by an absence of privity of contract.57
In both Dimoff and Daughtry, however, the courts cited exceptions
to the privity requirement for enforcing an express warranty. Perhaps one
of the most notable of these is the tort-based reliance principle found in
Baxter v. Ford Motor Co. 5
8
1. Tort-Based Reliance
In Baxter, a remote purchaser who lost his eye when a rock shat-
tered his car's windshield was allowed to maintain an action against an
automobile manufacturer that had represented the vehicle he had pur-
chased contained shatterproof glass.59 The court allowed the manufac-
turer's catalog and sales literature, upon which the consumer had relied
in purchasing the vehicle, to be admitted into evidence as the bases of
liability even though there was no privity of contract between the con-
sumer and manufacturer. The court held that lack of privity did not bar
the consumer's action because the consumer had relied on the manufac-
turer's representations with respect to a product attribute that the con-
sumer could not reasonably verify, and such reliance had resulted in his
injury.60
53. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
54. Dimoff, 55 Wash. 2d at 389, 347 P.2d at 1059.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 2-5.
56. See 91 Wash. 2d at 712-21, 592 P.2d at 635-39 (Rosellini, J., dissenting). For an analysis
of Justice Rosellini's dissent, see infra text accompanying notes 213-328.
57. Id. at 711, 592 P.2d at 634.
58. 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932).
59. Id. at 456, 12 P.2d at 409.
60. Id. at 461-62, 12 P.2d at 412. The holding in Baxter appears to have been based in tort
rather than contract law since the court's opinion negates an obligation in contract. Id. See Freeman
v. Navarre, 47 Wash. 2d 760, 289 P.2d 1015 (1955) (exception to privity requirement based on dan-
gerous instrumentality); Bock v. Truck & Tractor, Inc., 18 Wash. 2d 458, 464-65, 139 P.2d 706, 709
(1943) (liability in Baxter based on tort, not contract, law); but see Malcolm L. Edwards, Privity;
Property Damage; and Personal Injuries... A Re-Appraisal, 32 WASH. L. REV. 153, 155 (1957).
Moreover, subsequent opinions in Dimoff, 55 Wash. 2d 385, 389, 347 P.2d 1056, 1059 (1960), and
Daughtry, 91 Wash. 2d at 710-11, 592 P.2d at 634, distinguish the Baxter case on the ground that
the product involved in that case was in an inherently dangerous condition.
2005]
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 28:239
2. Third-Party Beneficiaries
Another exception to the privity requirement, or an extension of the
privity concept, exists where the entity seeking to enforce a warranty is a
third-party beneficiary of the warrantor's promise. 61 This exception is
exemplified by Jeffery v. Hanson.62 There the plaintiff contracted to pur-
chase a truck from a dealer who had located a truck with another dealer,
the defendant. In a telephone conversation among the three individuals,
the plaintiff stated that he would purchase the vehicle only if it were war-
The court's opinion in Baxter relied on the decision in Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash.
622, 624, 135 P. 633, 634 (1913). There the court held that a restaurant could bring an action for
breach of implied warranty of merchantability against a food manufacturer for spoiled food that the
restaurant purchased from an intermediary and served to a customer. In holding that a food manufac-
turer impliedly warrants its products to whomever "may be damaged by reason of their use in the
legitimate channels," id. at 630, 135 P. at 636, the court set forth what have become oft-cited excep-
tions to the general privity requirement:
It has been accepted as a general rule that a manufacturer is not liable to any person other
than his immediate vendee; that the action is necessarily one upon an implied or express
warranty, and that without privity of contract no suit can be maintained; that each pur-
chaser must resort to his immediate vendor. To this rule certain exceptions have been
recognized: (1) Where the thing causing the injury is of a noxious or dangerous kind. (2)
Where the defendant has been guilty of fraud or deceit in passing off the article. (3)
Where the defendant has been negligent in some respect with reference to the sale or con-
struction of a thing not imminently dangerous.
Id. at 624, 135 P. at 634.
Although the articulated holding in the Mazetti case involves a nonprivity implied warranty,
the privity exceptions articulated by the court have been cited in cases involving express as well as
implied warranties. See, e.g., Daughtry, 91 Wash. 2d at 710-11, 592 P.2d at 634; Dimoff 55 Wash.
2d at 389, 347 P.2d at 1059; Baxter, 168 Wash. at 458-59, 12 P.2d at 411. Moreover, as one com-
mentator has pointed out, the second and third exceptions cited in Mazzeti are not exceptions to the
privity requirement for enforcement of a warranty but independent causes of action. Edwards, supra
at 155.
In Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969), the court adopted strict
liability in tort as set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1997) and "discarded" the
common law warranty for manufacturers set forth in Mazetti. 75 Wash. 2d at 531-32, 452 P.2d at
734-35. As a result, the common law action together with the privity exception for remote suppliers
no longer exists in Washington. See, e.g., Baughn v. Honda Motor Co. Ltd., 107 Wash. 2d 127, 150-
51, 727 P.2d 655, 668 (1986).
61. Washington warranty cases allowing remote buyers to assert claims as third-party benefici-
aries of either express or implied warranties do not consider the rights of the third-party beneficiaries
as based on exceptions to the privity requirement but rather consider the existence of third-party
beneficiary status as establishing privity between a remote seller and a remote buyer. See, e.g.,
Kadiak Fisheries Co. v. Murphy Diesel, Inc., 70 Wash. 2d 153, 165, 422 P.2d 496, 503 (1967); Lid-
strand v. Silvercrest Industries, 28 Wash. App. 359, 363, 623 P.2d 710, 713 (1981). This conception
of privity is broader than traditional interpretations of the requirement that confine privity to the
parties to a contract. See Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Selfridge, I A.C. 847, 853 (1915) (Haldane,
L.); HAWKLAND, supra note 14, § 2-318:1. Moreover, the conception of privity in the third-party
beneficiary warranty cases appears inconsistent with that in Mazetti, 75 Wash. 622, 624, 135 P. 633,
634, which is more consistent with traditional interpretations. See supra note 60.
62.39 Wash. 2d 855, 858-59, 239 P.2d 346 (1952).
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ranted to be ninety percent new and had never been used in salt water.63
Both the contracting dealer and the defendant stated that the defendant
would provide such warranties. 64 Moreover, the defendant knew that the
contracting dealer was purchasing the truck to sell to the plaintiff, with
the warranties being for the benefit of and to be delivered to the plain-
tiff.65 The defendant issued the warranties to the contracting dealer who
transmitted them to the plaintiff when the latter purchased the truck. The
truck broke down, and the plaintiff sued the defendant. The court held
that the privity requirement did not apply because, applying general con-
tract principles, the plaintiff was a third-party beneficiary of the defen-
dant's promise and was, as such, entitled to enforce the promise.66
Since the Jeffery case, three significant cases have purported to fol-
low the third-party beneficiary exception to the privity requirement. The
first is Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc.,6 7 in which the plaintiff pur-
chased a truck from a dealer. The truck's glove box contained a warranty
book from the truck's manufacturer with express warranties from the
manufacturer and component parts manufacturers.68 The truck's engine
failed after 6000 miles, and the engine's manufacturer attempted, but
failed, to remedy the defects in the engine. The plaintiff sued the engine
manufacturer for breach of its express warranty against defects in mate-
rial and workmanship. 69 The court held that the purchaser could, as a
third-party beneficiary of that manufacturer's warranty, sue the engine
manufacturer since the warranty obviously was for the benefit of the op-
erator, the purchaser.70 According to the court, this conclusion followed
from the fact that the engine manufacturer warranted the engine to be
free of defects for, among other things, 71 a specified number of hours of
63. Id. at 856, 239 P.2d at 347.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 858, 239 P.2d at 348.
67. 12 Wash. App. at 163-64, 528 P.2d at 994.
68. The court's opinion is somewhat confusing concerning the express warranty by Cummins
Diesel, the defendant whose warranty was relevant to the action, since the failure of the truck's
engine to conform to the Cummins Diesel warranty and the failure of Cummins Diesel satisfactorily
to repair that engine were the issues in dispute. Id. The court stated that a warranty booklet by White
Motors, the manufacturer of the truck, was in the truck's glove box and that the book contained a
component warranty for the Cummins diesel engine. Id. at 162-65, 528 P.2d at 993-94. Cummins
objected to being bound by this warranty, contending that it was the dealer's warranty. Id. at 163-64,
528 P.2d at 994. The court rejected the argument, not on the ground that Cummins Diesel made the
warranty, but rather on the basis that Cummins Diesel introduced a written warranty, the terms of
which were substantially the same as those in the manufacturer's booklet. Id. It was this latter war-
ranty upon which the buyer could bring an action against Cummins Diesel. Id.
69. Id. at 163, 528 P.2d at 994.
70. Id.
71. The Cummins Diesel warranty guaranteed the engine to be "free of defects 'for two years
or 100,000 miles or 3,600 hours of operation."' Id.
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"operation," the latter term implying that the warranty was for the direct
benefit of the operator during the warranty period. 72
Several years later, the same court applied a similar analysis in Lid-
strand v. Silvercrest Industries.7 3 There the plaintiffs purchased a used
mobile home from the original retail purchasers. The home leaked, and
the home's manufacturer attempted repairs, which were halted when the
manufacturer discovered that the plaintiffs were not the original retail
purchasers.7 4 The plaintiffs sued the manufacturer on the latter's express
warranty that the home would be free from defects in material and
workmanship for twelve months.75 Citing the Schroeder case, the court
held that the plaintiffs were intended beneficiaries of the manufacturer's
warranty since the warranty was in effect for twelve months regardless of
who owned the home.76
The final case applying the third-party beneficiary exception is
Touchet Valley Grain Growers, Inc. v. Opp & Seibold General Constr.,
inc.7 7 In that case, the plaintiff entered into a contract to have a steel
grain-storage building constructed by a contractor. The contractor, in
turn, contracted with the defendant to have the latter design the building
and supply its components. When a portion of the building collapsed,
causing damage to the rest of the building, the plaintiff sued the defen-
78 ifasredant for breach of express and implied warranties. The plaintiff asserted
the existence of four express warranties, the first and second of which
were in the defendant's advertising brochure, telling remote purchasers
that the defendant's buildings were "tailor-made and of the highest qual-
ity."'79 The third warranty consisted of the defendant's "standard war-
ranty," guaranteeing the building materials for one year.80 This warranty
72. Id.
73. 28 Wash. App. 359, 623 P.2d 710 (1981).
74. The manufacturer resumed attempting to make repairs when prompted by the state but
failed in its attempts. Id. at 362, 623 P.2d at 713.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 361-63, 623 P.2d at 713-14. The court's analysis of the manufacturer's warranty and
privity issue differs in one respect from that in Schroeder. In holding that the plaintiffs were third-
party beneficiaries of the manufacturer's warranty, the court found that the manufacturer made the
warranty to the original retail purchasers. The latter purchasers, however, did not buy the mobile
home from the manufacturer, but from a dealer. Therefore, there was no privity between the original
purchasers and the manufacturer. Thus, there were two privity problems in the case: the first involv-
ing the original purchasers and the manufacturer, and the latter concerning the plaintiffs and the
manufacturer. Both are vertical privity problems since they involve parties in the chain of distribu-
tion from the party who was in privity with the warrantor and not some product user associated or
related to the privity purchaser. See HAWKLAND, supra note 14, § 2-318:1; WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 14.
77. 119 Wash. 2d 334, 831 P.2d 724 (1992).
78. Id. at 339, 831 P.2d at 727.
79. Id. at 347-48, 831 P.2d at 731.
80. Id.
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was included in the defendant's price book, which apparently was avail-
able to its immediate, but not remote, purchasers. The final warranty was
contained in the purchase order with the defendant's purchaser and as-
sured the quality of the defendant's products. 8' Relying heavily on the
decisions in Lidstrand and Schroeder, the court held that the standard
one-year warranty was for the benefit of and enforceable by the plaintiff
since the warranty would mean little to the contractor who built the struc-
ture and then moved on to its next job.82 Without any substantial analy-
sis, the court also ruled that the plaintiff could enforce the final warranty,
the quality assurance in the purchase order, 83 as a third-party beneficiary
of the defendant's promise,84 even though the guarantee in the purchase
order appeared to be no different from the garden-variety warranties in
Dimofj/ 5 and Daughtry8 6 for which privity of contract was required.
Although the Jeffery case is correctly decided on third-party benefi-
ciary principles, 87 the Lidstrand, Schroeder, and Touchet cases are more
difficult to justify on legal grounds. These cases decided that an express
warranty for a period of time obviously is for the direct benefit of a third
party if that individual is the one who will be in possession of or using
the good during the warranty period.88 Not considered was the possibility
that the warranty for a period of time might simply operate for the direct
legal benefit of the immediate purchaser. 89 Although an immediate pur-
81. Id.
82. Id. at 349-50, 831 P.2d at 732.
83. On two occasions in its opinion, the court opined that the defendant's express warranties
were enforceable by the plaintiffs as third-party beneficiaries, a statement that literally appears to
apply to the first two representations that were in the defendant's brochure to remote purchasers. Id.
at 344, 350, 831 P.2d at 729, 732. Given the court's discussion of those representations in relation-
ship to section 62A.2-313 of the Revised Code of Washington, it is arguable that the court intended
to treat the latter representations not under a third-party beneficiary analysis but rather under the
analysis in Baughn v. Honda Motor Co. Ltd., 107 Wash. 2d 127, 727 P.2d 655 (1986), which is
discussed hereinafter. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-313 (1965); see infra text accompanying notes
106-120.
84. Touchet, 119 Wash. 2d at 343-44, 831 P.2d at 729 (1992).
85. 55 Wash. 2d 385, 386-87, 347 P.2d 1056, 1057-58 (1960).
86. 91 Wash. 2d 704, 592 P.2d 631 (1979).
87. Under Washington law, whether a party is a third-party beneficiary depends on whether the
parties to a contract intended the promisor to assume a direct obligation to the third party. Lonsdale
v. Chesterfield, 99 Wash. 2d 353, 360-61, 662 P.2d 385, 389 (1983). That intent is based on whether
performance under the contract would necessarily and directly benefit the third party. Id.; Burg v.
Shannon & Wilson, Inc., 110 Wash. App. 798, 808, 43 P.3d 526, 532 (2002).
88. 119 Wash. 2d at 349-50, 831 P.2d at 732; Lidstrand v. Silvercrest Indus., 28 Wash. App.
359, 363-65, 623 P.2d 710, 714 (1981); Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 12 Wash. App. 161, 163-
64, 528 P.2d 992, 994 (1974) rev'd on other grounds, 86 Wash. 2d 256, 544 P.2d 20 (1975).
89. See Goodman v. PPG Industries, Inc., 849 A.2d 1239 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (producer's 26-
year express warranty for wood preservative sold to window manufacturer for use in making win-
dows sold to residential customers was not intended to extend to such customers who could not sue
as beneficiaries of the warranty); Chem Tech Finishers, Inc. v. Paul Mueller Co., 375 S.E.2d 881
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chaser might not possess or be using a good at the time a breach occurs
or becomes manifest under a remote seller's warranty, that purchaser still
has an enforceable interest in the remote seller's obligation under the
warranty. At the breach stage, that obligation is to pay the immediate
buyer damages for breach of warranty or to indemnify that purchaser for
losses for which it is liable to a remote purchaser. 90 This analysis is sup-
ported by the decision in Fortune View Condominium Ass 'n v. Fortune
Star Development Co.91 There the court held that a warrantee under sev-
eral express warranties, 92 apparently including one for a period of time
during which the warrantee would not be in possession of the goods,93
could bring an action for indemnification against the warrantor resulting
from the making of these express warranties.94
In addition to bringing an action for indemnification, an immediate
buyer that has warranted a good to a remote buyer and has been sued for
breach of warranty may "vouch in" a remote seller that has warranted the
goods to it.95 U.C.C. section 2-607(5) codifies the common law proce-
(Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (manufacturer warranty in brochure to distributor not intended to benefit remote
purchaser even though remote purchaser saw the brochure, the goods were manufactured to remote
buyer's specifications, and the manufacturer shipped the goods directly to the remote buyer).
90. In Central Washington Refrigeration Inc. v. Barbee, 133 Wash. 2d 509, 513-15, 946 P.2d
760, 762-63 (1997), the Washington Supreme Court held that there is an implied in fact contractual
indemnity obligation when a buyer incurs liability to a third party that occurs because of a noncon-
formity in the goods that would constitute a breach of the seller's express or implied obligation. This
implied indemnification obligation, while based on a seller's warranty obligation, is distinct from an
action for breach of warranty as is evidenced by the fact that the statute of limitations for breach of
the indemnity obligation is not that in section 2-715(2) but rather begins to run when the party seek-
ing indemnification pays or is legally obligated to pay damages to a third party. 133 Wash. 2d at
517-18, 946 P.2d at 764-65. For criticism of this interpretation of the effect the implied indemnity
obligation has on the statute of limitations, see Thomas A. Leggette, When Can an Implied Indem-
nity Cause ofAction be Used to End-Run a Limitations Bar?, 42 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNs. Q. 33
(1991) and Paul J. Wilkinson, An Ind. Run Around the U.C.C.: The Use (or Abuse?) of Indemnity, 20
PEPP. L. REV. 1407, 1438 (1993).
91. 151 Wash. 2d 534, 90 P.3d 1062 (2004).
92. The warrantee in Fortune View Condominium Assoc. was a remote purchaser of the goods
who was able to enforce the warranties, not as a third-party beneficiary, but on the basis discussed
infra in text accompanying notes 106-120. It sought indemnification for damages that purchasers of
the goods attempted to recover from it when the goods originally sold by the express warrantor
failed to conform to its warranties. 151 Wash. 2d at 536-37, 90 P.3d at 1063.
93. The remote seller's express warranties were contained in a brochure distributed to the
remote purchaser, which stated that the goods were provided with a five-year limited warranty. Id.
The court's opinion does not indicate whether the remote purchaser could utilize this five-year war-
ranty as well as other express representations in the brochure as a basis for its indemnification claim.
94. Id. at 539-41,90 P.3d at 1065-66.
95. Central Washington Refrigeration, Inc., 133 Wash. 2d at 513-15, 946 P.2d at 762-63;
Dixon v. Fiat-Roosevelt Motors, Inc., 8 Wash. App. 689, 509 P.2d 86 (1973); see also Ronan E.
Degnan & Alan J. Barton, Vouching to Quality Warranty: Case Law and Commercial Code, 51 CAL.
L. REV. 471,481-82 (1963).
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dure of vouching in.96 Under that section, an immediate buyer who is
sued for breach of warranty for which the remote seller is answerable
over may give the remote seller notice of the litigation, which would en-
able the remote seller to defend the buyer's action. If the remote seller
then fails to offer a defense, it will be bound by any finding of fact com-
mon to the remote buyer's suit against the immediate buyer and a suit
between the immediate buyer and the remote seller. 97 Although a remote
seller may be liable over for breach of its warranty, there are additional
costs when contracting parties make that seller directly liable to a remote
buyer as a third-party beneficiary, 98 and a warrantor and its immediate
buyer may find that liability suboptimal.
Even if it is clear, as it was in the Schroeder99 case, that a warranty
is for the benefit of a remote buyer, a warrantor's promise does not nec-
essarily create a third-party beneficiary contract. Under contract law, a
third-party beneficiary is not the person to whom a promisor addresses
its promise; that person is the promisee.'00 Rather, a third-party benefici-
ary is a person in whom rights to enforce a promisor's obligation exist to
effectuate the perceived intentions of the promisor and promisee. 01 With
respect to the warranties in the Lidstrand and Schroeder cases, the war-
rantors probably addressed their promises or affirmations directly to the
remote buyers and not to the immediate buyers with the remote buyers as
third-party beneficiaries. 102 In both cases, the warranties appear to have
been garden-variety manufacturer warranties with promises made to the
96. See HAWKLAND, supra note 14, § 2-607:9.
97. See id (discussing vouching in for warranty of quality as opposed to warranty of title).
98. See infra text accompanying notes 184-185 and 272-320 on additional costs of liability to
remote buyers.
99. 12 Wash. App. 161, 163-64, 528 P.2d 992, 994 (1974) rev'don other grounds, 86 Wash.
2d 256, 544 P.2d 20 (1975). In finding that the remote buyer was a third-party beneficiary of the
Cummins warranty, the trial court attached significance to a Cummins employee's testimony that the
warranty was for the benefit of the end user of the engine. Id. As indicated, supra note 87, the test
under Washington law whether an entity is a third-party beneficiary is whether the parties to a con-
tract intended the promisor to assume a direct obligation to the third party. That intent is derived
from the effect of the terms of the contract and not an examination of the parties' "motives or de-
sires." See Burg v. Shannon & Wilson, Inc., 110 Wash. App. 798, 808, 43 P.3d 526, 532 (2002). The
point of the text is not that subjective intent ought to be determinative but that even if a contract
directly benefits an entity, it is not a third-party beneficiary if it is the promisee of the promise.
100. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 (1981). Cf Oman v. Yates, 70 Wash. 2d
181, 422 P.2d 489 (1967).
101. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981); FARNSWORTH, supra note 44,
at 657-64. Cf Vikingstad v. Baggot, 46 Wash. 2d 494, 282 P.2d 824 (1955).
102. As indicated, supra note 83, the court's opinion in Touchet indicated that the defendant's
affirmations in its advertising brochure that were made and given to remote purchasers, not to the
immediate buyers, were enforceable as third-party beneficiary contracts. Touchet Valley Grain
Growers, Inc. v. Opp & Seibold Gen. Constr., Inc., 119 Wash. 2d 334, 350, 831 P.2d 724, 732
(1992). If the court so considered them, the objections raised in the text apply to that conclusion
since the promises were not made to the immediate buyer for the benefit of the remote buyer.
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remote buyers as promisees. 1 3 Indeed, the warranties were probably very
similar to the Ford Motor Co. warranty in the Dimoff case, which the
court held to be unenforceable by the remote buyers because of a lack of
privity of contract. 10 4 If not enforceable as third-party beneficiary con-
tracts, the promises and affirmations in Schroeder and Lidstrand need to
be justified on some other basis in warranty or contract law.
10 5
3. Express Representations to Remote Buyers
That other basis is found in Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., ' 06 and the
Touchet'0 7 and Tex Enterprises, Inc. 108 cases. In Baughn, the court re-
jected an express warranty claim by parents whose children were injured
riding mini-trail bikes manufactured by the defendant. 10 9 The plaintiffs
contended that the defendant's statements about the mini-trail bikes, ap-
parently made to remote buyers, constituted express warranties under the
U.C.C. " 0 Rather than upholding dismissal of the warranty claim for lack
of privity or holding that U.C.C. section 2-313 does not apply to a repre-
sentation made by a seller to a remote buyer,"' the court held that the
defendant's statements were mere commendations of the bikes, not af-
103. See Lidstrand v. Silvercrest Indus., 28 Wash. App. 359, 361, 623 P.2d 710, 712 (1981);
Schroeder, 12 Wash. App. at 162, 528 P.2d at 993. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals
in Evergreen Inv. Group, L.L.C. v. Porter, No. 30664-6-11, 2004 WL 1732373 (Wash. Ct. App.
2004), held that two representations made by a seller directly to a remote buyer as promisee would
be enforceable by the remote buyer as express warranties because the promisee was a contract third-
party beneficiary of the seller's implied warranties, which satisfied the privity requirement. Id. at
*4-5. A more appropriate analysis of the express representations made to the remote buyer as pro-
missee would have been that discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 106-120.
104.55 Wash. 2d 385, 389, 347 P.2d 1056, 1059 (1960).
105. New section 2-313A provides for the enforceability of a "pass-through warranty," made
by a remote seller in a writing accompanying the goods that is intended for the ultimate buyer, but
not as a warranty since there is no contract between the obligor and obligee. See U.C.C. § 2-313A,
cmt. 1 (2003). Rather, the section treats the obligation as existing independently of a contract and as
being enforceable so long as the obligor makes an affirmation, description, or promise pertaining to
the goods in a record packaged with and accompanying the goods that is furnished to the remote
purchaser. U.C.C. § 2-313A(l)-(3). If such pass-through warranties are enforceable as third-party
beneficiary contracts as held in Schroeder and Lidstrand, there is no need for section 2-313A since
the warranties are already enforceable by remote buyers under section 1-103(b), which allows for
supplementary principles of law, such as that pertaining to third-party beneficiaries, to supplement
the terms of the Code unless displaced by particular provisions of the Code. Because no provision of
the Code deals with vertical privity problems, common law third-party beneficiary principles are
available to supplement warranty law under the Code. See Touchet, 119 Wash. 2d at 345-46, 831
P.2d at 730.
106. 107 Wash. 2d 127, 151-52, 727 P.2d 655, 669 (1986).
107. 119 Wash. 2d at 334, 831 P.2d at 724.
108. 149 Wash. 2d 204, 66 P.3d 625 (2003).
109. 107 Wash. 2d at 150-51, 727 P.2d at 668-69.
110. Id. at 133, 151, 727 P.2d at 659, 668-69.
111. See text accompanying supra notes 34-36.
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firmations of fact required to constitute warranties under section 2-
313.l12 In analyzing the plaintiffs' express warranty claim, the court
stated that the privity requirement to enforce a warranty is relaxed when
a seller makes an express representation, "in advertising or otherwise," to
a remote buyer.' 3 The court also added that such a buyer must meet the
basis of the bargain requirement in section 2-313 by proving that it was
aware of the seller's representation.' 14 In essence, a remote buyer can sue
a seller under section 2-313 for breach of express warranty so long as it
satisfies the substantive requirements of that section, even though there is
no contract between that buyer and the seller.
In Touchet, the court cited the Baughn case to support a relaxation
of the privity requirement for express warranties made to remote buy-
ers." 5 The court then indicated that two representations in a seller's ad-
vertising brochure to remote buyers were enforceable under the Baughn
analysis.' 16
Finally, in the Tex Enterprises, Inc.117 case, the court reversed an
appellate court ruling that a remote buyer could sue a manufacturer for
breach of implied warranty of merchantability but added that the buyer
could attempt to prove on remand that the manufacturer made an express
warranty to the remote buyer." 8 The alleged express warranty consisted
of a representation by the manufacturer's representative to the remote
buyer that the manufacturer's containers were just as good as those the
buyer was then using, a representation that was made prior to the time
the buyer entered into a contract to purchase the manufacturer's contain-
ers from a third party." 9 Significantly, in opining on which state's law
governed the determination of whether the manufacturer's representation
constituted a warranty, the court noted that the remote buyer's warranty
claim did not depend on the contract between the manufacturer and its
immediate buyer. 20 Being independent of the contract between the
manufacturer and the immediate buyer, the remote buyer's warranty
claim was predicated not on the remote buyer being a third-party benefi-
112. Baughn, 107 Wash. 2d at 152, 727 P.2d at 669.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 151-52, 727 P.2d at 669.
115. 119 Wash. 2d at 347-48, 831 P.2d at 731.
116. Id. But as mentioned previously, see supra note 83, on two occasions the court's opinion
appears to indicate that the affirmations in the advertising brochure were enforceable because the
remote buyer was a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the seller and its immediate pur-
chaser. The court's language differs, however, from its immediate discussion of the two representa-
tions contained in the advertising brochure, a discussion that relied on the analysis in Baughn. Id.
117. 149 Wash. 2d 204, 66 P.3d 625.
118. Id. at 213-14, 66 P.3d at 630.
119. Id. at 206, 66 P.3d at 626.
120. Id.
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ciary of that contract but rather, in light of the Baughn case, on its ability
to satisfy the criteria in section 2-313.121
A difficulty with applying section 2-313 to affirmations or promises
such as those in Lidstrand and Schroeder, other than the fact that the sec-
tion applies to a contract between a seller and a buyer, 1 2 is the section's
requirement that such a representation be part of the basis of the bargain
between the parties. 23 In Baughn, the court stated that a remote buyer
seeking to enforce an express warranty must establish that it was aware
of the representation, apparently prior to acquiring the warrantor's
good. 124 In the Schroeder case, it is quite possible that the remote buyer
could have satisfied this obligation since the court's opinion indicates
that the buyer saw the manufacturer's warranty book prior to purchasing
the truck. 2 5 On the other hand, in many cases, including those involving
relatively expensive items, buyers are not aware of representations ac-
companying the goods until after they have purchased the goods. The
requirement that a purchaser be aware of a representation prior to pur-
chase is not as severe an impediment to enforcement of an express war-
ranty as it is in cases, such as Touchet, where the affirmation or promise
is contained in a remote seller's advertising, since the buyer may more
frequently be aware of the seller's statement prior to purchase. 126 But
121. See id at 213, 66 P.3d at 630.
122. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
123. U.C.C. § 2-313(1). Given the propriety of enforcing remote seller representations because
they are part of the bundle of attributes sold with a product and included in its price (see infra notes
127-128 and accompanying text), one can perceive how the courts in the Lidstrand and Schroeder
cases concluded they ought to be enforceable by remote buyers and utilized third-party beneficiary
analysis to obtain that result.
124. 107 Wash. 2d at 151-52, 727 P.2d at 669.
125. Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 12 Wash. App. 161, 163-64, 528 P.2d 992, 993 (1974)
rev 'd on other grounds, 86 Wash. 2d 256, 544 P.2d 20 (1975).
126. Authority is divided on the question of whether a buyer needs to be aware of an affirma-
tion, promise, or description for it to be part of the basis of the bargain. For authority requiring prior
knowledge, see, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3rd Cir. 1990); Global Truck
& Equip. Co., Inc. v. Palmer Mach. Works, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 641 (N.D. Miss. 1986); Landman v.
Bloomer, 23 So. 75 (Ala. 1898); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alter, 834 S.W.2d 136 (Ark. 1992); Anderson
v. Heron Eng'g Co., Inc., 604 P.2d 674 (Colo. 1979); Cuthbertson v. Clark Equip. Co., 448 A.2d
315, 321 (Me. 1982); Interco Inc. v. Randustrial Corp., 533 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976);
Stang v. Hertz Corp., 490 P.2d 475, 477 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971); Schmaltz v. Nissen, 431 N.W.2d 657
(S.D. 1988); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 14, § 9-5; John E. Murray, Jr., "Basis of the Bargain ":
Transcending Classical Concepts, 66 MINN. L. REV. 283, 315 (1982). Contra, see Winston Indus. v.
Stuyvesant Ins. Co., Inc., 317 So. 2d 493, 495-96 (Ala. Civ. App. 1975); Jackson v. Muhlenberg
Hosp., 232 A.2d 879, 888 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1967); Daughtrey v. Ashe, 413 S.E.2d 336, 339 (Va. 1992);
NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CONSUMER WARRANTY LAW § 3.5.2 (1997), ROBERT J.
NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES 209 (1970); Robert S. Adler, The Last Best Argu-
ment for Eliminating Reliance From Express Warranties: "Real- World" Consumers Don't Read
Warranties, 45 S.C. L. REV. 429, 468-70 (1994); Sidney Kwestel, Freedom From Reliance: A Con-
tract Approach to Express Warranty, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 959, 976-77, 982-84 (1992); Kevin
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even in those cases there are instances in which a seller will make an af-
firmation or promise to the market, which is treated by the market as an
attribute of the product and priced as part of the bundle of attributes con-
stituting the product,12 and a particular buyer will not be aware of the
representation prior to purchase. Elsewhere it has been argued that a "ba-
sis of the bargain" test requiring ex ante knowledge of a seller's repre-
sentation offered to the market is inefficient, inconsistent with the man-
ner in which markets determine product attributes including warranties,
and inappropriate in depriving a buyer of a product attribute for which it
has paid.128 Nevertheless, elimination of the ex ante knowledge require-
ment in establishing that a representation was part of the basis of the bar-
gain does not appear likely, 29 leaving the enforceability of many seller
affirmations and promises to remote buyers in doubt.130
Mclvers, The Meaning of "Part of the Basis of the Bargain," 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 447, 452
(1979).
127. See Thomas J. Holdych & Bruce D. Mann, The Basis of the Bargain Requirement: A
Market and Economic Based Analysis of Express Warranties - Getting What You Pay for and Pay-
ingfor What You Get, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 781, 794-96 (1996) (discussing warranties as product
attributes and the inclusion of those attributes in a product's price).
128. ld. at 801-02. The authors demonstrate that markets determine product attributes, includ-
ing contract terms and warranties, and that a test for the enforceability of an express warranty that
requires a buyer to demonstrate ex ante knowledge of a representation is inefficient in imposing
unnecessary transaction costs in acquiring knowledge of the representation. Id. Rather, representa-
tions made to the market as a whole in the sale of a product, whether known or bargained for by an
individual buyer, should be treated as enforceable express warranties. Id. at 802-03.
Professor Curtis R. Reitz has also demonstrated that imposing a knowledge requirement, particularly
for remote buyers, imposes interpretive difficulties:
If a knowledge requirement is retained, an array of interpretive problems can be foreseen:
If a buyer had seen or heard a manufacturer's advertisement, but had no conscious
awareness or recall of that advertisement when entering into a retail transaction, is the
buyer protected? If a buyer is influenced to select certain goods by another person who
had seen or heard an advertisement, is this indirect knowledge imputed to the buyer so as
to meet the requirement?
Reitz, supra note 16, at 390-91.
129. As indicated, supra note 105, new section 2-313A does not require a remote buyer to have
ex ante knowledge of a seller affirmation or promise accompanying the goods for an enforceable
obligation to exist on the part of the seller to the remote buyer. On the other hand, new section 2-
313B requires that a remote purchaser have ex ante knowledge of a seller's affirmation or promise
that is contained in advertising or similar communications to the public, communications like the
advertising brochure in the Touchet case.
130. As a matter of contract law, the basis of the bargain test should not require a remote buyer
to establish that it knew of an affirmation or promise prior to purchase where the representation is
one of the terms of a bargain between a remote seller and its immediate buyer, and the remote buyer
is a third-party beneficiary of the affirmation or promise. Cf FARNSWORTH, supra note 44, at 675-78
(third-party beneficiary subject to defenses that affect enforceability of promisor's agreement with
promisee). Thus, in the Touchet case, the promises contained in the seller's price book and in the
purchase agreement between the seller and the immediate buyer would be enforceable by the remote
buyer as third-party beneficiary contracts so long as the representations were part of the express
terms between the seller and the immediate buyer and the requirements for third-party beneficiary
contracts were satisfied.
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4. Distinguishing Between the Exceptions to the Privity Requirement
Whether an affirmation or promise sought to be enforced by a re-
mote buyer is enforceable under section 2-313 or as a third-party benefi-
ciary contract is important not only in determining the criteria for en-
forceability of such a representation but also in deciding what effects the
contract between the seller and immediate purchaser might have on the
remote buyer's claims. The effects of the parol evidence rule 131 and limi-
tations of remedies, 32 among others, 33 may depend on whether a war-
ranty is enforceable as a third-party beneficiary contract or in accordance
with the terms of section 2-313. 134
In the Touchet case, for example, some of the warranties were con-
tained in a sales brochure distributed to remote buyers. Although the
court's analysis of the remote buyer's warranty claims indicates that the
claims were enforceable under section 2-313, the court's opinion on two
occasions states rather broadly that the remote seller's express warran-
ties, apparently all of them, were enforceable as third-party beneficiary
contracts. 135 If the warranties were enforceable under section 2-313, the
remote buyer's claims would not depend on the contract between the
seller and the immediate buyer. That being the case, a merger clause or
limitation of remedy contained in the contract between the immediate
parties would not affect the rights of the remote buyer with respect to the
seller's warranties.
Those results would follow both conceptually from the relationship
of the parties and their agreements and from the terms of the U.C.C. Spe-
cifically, the parol evidence rule excludes evidence of conflicting terms
131. U.C.C. § 2-202 (2001).
132. Id. § 2-719 (2001).
133. Tex Enterprises, Inc. v. Brockway Standard, Inc., 149 Wash. 2d 204, 66 P.3d 625 (2003)
(choice of law provision).
134. See supra note 83. Some authority indicates that there should be little or no difference, at
least with respect to remedy limitations, between the rights of a person asserting warranty rights
directly under section 2-313 and an individual making a warranty claim as a third-party beneficiary.
In Arlie R. Nogay, Enforcing the Rights of Remote Sellers Under the UC.C.: Warranty Disclaimers,
the Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose and the Notice Requirement in the Non-
privity Context, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 873, 897 (1986), the author maintains that a remedy limitation
under section 2-719 should be enforceable by a remote seller against a remote buyer if the limitation
is "properly structured" into the agreement between the remote buyer and its seller in a manner that
informs the remote buyer that the remote seller is limiting the remote buyer's remedies. Consistent
with his analysis of warranty modifications and disclaimers the author posits, at least implicitly, that
a remedy limitation is ineffective if it is merely contained in the agreement of which the remote
buyer is a third-party beneficiary. See id. at 894-95. For a contrary analysis of the effectiveness upon
a third party of warranty modifications and disclaimers contained in a contract between the immedi-
ate parties to a sale that is applicable to remedy limitations, see Jean Fleming Powers, Expanded
Liability and the Intent Requirement in Third-Party Beneficiary Contracts, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 67,
130-33 (1993).
135. 119 Wash. 2d at 344, 350, 831 P.2d at 729, 732.
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in an antecedent agreement or in a contemporaneous oral agreement
where parties adopt a writing that embodies their agreement. The rule
also excludes evidence of even consistent additional terms if the parties
adopt the writing as a complete embodiment of all the terms of their
agreement.136 The parol evidence rule in section 2-202 provides that
terms "to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree" or
which are contained in a "writing intended by the parties as a final ex-
pression of their agreement" may not be contradicted or supplemented
under the circumstances articulated immediately above.' 37 Section 1-
201(b)(3) defines "agreement" as the bargain of the parties in fact, and
section 1-201(b)(26) specifies that a "party" is one who has engaged in a
transaction or made an agreement subject to the U.C.C. Both conceptu-
ally and under the U.C.C., it is the parties to the immediate agreement
who decide whether contemporaneous or antecedent terms are dis-
charged by a subsequent writing.' 38 In the case of a remote seller's com-
munication, such as advertising or a pass-through warranty that accom-
panies the goods, that agreement consists of the terms of the seller's
communication to the remote buyer and not of the agreement between
the seller and the immediate buyer. 139 It is unreasonable to believe that a
remote buyer would implicitly assent to a seller's discharging, under the
parol evidence rule, a commitment made to the remote buyer in a direct
communication from the seller by including a contrary term or a merger
clause in the seller's agreement with its immediate buyer. Such a belief is
unreasonable because a remote buyer, and the entire market of remote
buyers, would find it difficult, if not impossible, to price the seller's war-
ranty commitment if that commitment could be eliminated in a collateral
or subsequent agreement with the seller's immediate buyer. Indeed, a
136. U.C.C. § 2-202; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 213, 215 (1981).
137. U.C.C. § 2-202.
138. Id. ("[T]erms ... intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement... may
not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement ...
but may be ... supplemented by ... consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to
have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.")
(emphasis added).
139. Calling a remote seller's commitment the agreement under sections 1-201 (b)(3) and 2-202
is difficult technically since the term "agreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact. U.C.C. §
1-201(b)(3) (2001). Where a remote seller makes affirmations or promises to remote buyers through
advertising or pass-through warranties, for example, there is no bargain between the seller and the
remote buyer. Such affirmations or promises generally are not like that in Carlill, [1 893] 1 Q.B. 256
(1892), where the manufacturer could be perceived as bargaining for a buyer to purchase its product
from a retail seller. No such bargaining occurs in most remote seller transactions. Rather, a seller
depends on the price of a warranty being embedded in the price that remote buyers pay for their
goods, at least part of which a remote seller obtains in the sale prices to immediate buyers. Cf
Holdych & Mann, supra note 127, at 794-801 (discussing warranties as product attributes that are
included in a product's price).
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remote buyer and the market would probably discount the seller's com-
mitment to a point where its price would equal zero. This result would be
suboptimal if the seller had a comparative advantage in providing a war-
ranty to a remote buyer and intended to do so. Thus, in the Touchet case,
if the seller had included a merger clause in the contract with its immedi-
ate buyer, that clause should have had no effect on the affirmations and
promises that the seller made in the advertising brochure distributed to
remote buyers.
The same analysis should apply to remedy limitations and similar
terms in the contract between the seller and its immediate buyer. Section
2-719 of the U.C.C. allows for modification or limitation of a buyer's
remedies for breach. Like section 2-202, it provides for such limitation or
modification by "agreement," which ought to be the terms of the seller's
representations to the remote buyer and not the agreement between the
seller and its immediate buyer. 4 With respect to other terms, such as
choice of law provisions, the court's opinion in Tex Enterprises, Inc.
makes clear that the agreement between the seller and its immediate
buyer does not govern the relationship between the seller and the remote
buyer.141 In that case, the invoice provided by the seller to its distributor
contained a choice of law provision specifying that Georgia law gov-
erned the agreement. In discussing the need to litigate on remand the
question whether the seller made an express warranty to the remote
buyer, the court said that because the seller had correctly conceded that
the remote buyer's express warranty claim was not dependent on the
contract between the seller and the distributor, Washington law, not
Georgia law, would determine whether the seller's representations
amounted to a warranty. 42 In other words, the choice of law provision in
the seller-distributor contract did not govern the express warranty, if any,
by the seller to the remote buyer.
140. For a remedy limitation to be effective under Washington law, it must be effectuated in a
conscionable manner. See M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 140 Wash. 2d
568, 585, 998 P.2d 305, 314 (2000); Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 256, 259, 544
P.2d 20, 23 (1975). A remedy limitation may be conscionable and enforceable even though there is
no bargaining or individual negotiation of the limitation. See Schroeder, 86 Wash. 2d at 259, 544
P.2d at 23.
141. 149 Wash. 2d at 213-14, 66 P.3d at 630.
142. Id.
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IV. IMPLIED WARRANTY OBLIGATIONS TO REMOTE BUYERS
A. The Uniform Commercial Code and the
General Privity Requirement in Washington
Article 2 of the U.C.C. provides for two implied warranties: a war-
ranty of merchantability1 43 and a warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose. 144 The warranty of merchantability is implied in a contract for the
sale of goods if the seller is a merchant with respect to the goods in-
volved. It requires that the goods at least meet certain criteria. The most
common of these criteria are that the goods pass without objection in the
trade under the contract description and that the goods be fit for their or-
dinary purpose.145 The warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arises
if, at the time of contracting, a seller has reason to know any particular
purpose for which a good is required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to provide a suitable good. 146 The fitness for
particular purpose warranty arises if the buyer's purpose for the goods is
peculiar or idiosyncratic to the buyer and not the purpose for which the
goods are generally used. 147 Although these implied warranties are not
part of an "agreement" or "bargain in fact,"' 148 the U.C.C. indicates that
there must be a contract between a seller and the person seeking to en-
force an implied warranty. 149
In what appears to be a rather traditional case involving an implied
warranty claim by a remote purchaser, the Washington Supreme Court in
Baughn v. Honda Motor Co. 150 held that, because of lack of privity of
contract, a purchaser of a mini-trail bike could not sue the bike's manu-
facturer for breach of an implied warranty for injuries sustained by his
son. 15 Although the facts are unclear from the court's opinion, it appears
143. U.C.C. § 2-314 (2001).
144. Id. § 2-315 (2001).
145. Id. § 2-314.
146. Id. § 2-315.
147. Miles v. Ford Motor Co., 922 S.W.2d 572, 586 (Tex. App. 1996).
148. See supra note 25.
149. See supra note 16. The privity requirement is subject to the exception for statutory third-
party beneficiaries in section 2-318. See supra note 14.
150. 107 Wash. 2d 127, 151, 727 P.2d 655, 69 (1986).
151. The Baughn case was one for personal injuries suffered by the plaintiffs while riding one
of the defendant's motor trail bikes. Id. at 129, 727 P.2d at 657. In a series of cases, Washington
courts held that a common law warranty of merchantability existed on the part of a manufacturer
with no privity requirement that its goods would not inflict personal injuries. See Brown v. Quick
Mix Co., Div. Koehring Co., 75 Wash. 2d 833, 837, 454 P.2d 205, 208 (1969); Brewer v. Oriard
Powder Co., 66 Wash. 2d 187, 189-93, 401 P.2d 844, 846-47 (1965); Esborg v. Bailey Drug Co., 61
Wash. 2d 351, 378 P.2d 298, 301 (1963); La Hue v. Coca-Cola Bottling, Inc., 50 Wash. 2d 645,
647-48, 314 P.2d 421, 422 (1957); Nelson v. West Coast Dairy Co., 5 Wash. 2d 284, 290, 105 P.2d
76, 79 (1940); Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 624, 135 P. 633, 634 (1913). As discussed,
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that the purchaser was invoking an implied warranty from the manufac-
turer to the dealer from whom he purchased the bike, which he then, at
least implicitly, claimed extended to himself. The court justified its hold-
ing by citing prior cases requiring privity of contract for a breach of im-
plied warranty claim.15
2
Despite the breadth of the Baughn opinion, Washington courts have
allowed some remote purchasers to enforce implied warranties as third-
party beneficiaries of the warranties. On the other hand, the Washington
Supreme Court has rejected a much more pervasive exception to the
privity requirement, one that would permit a remote purchaser to claim
the existence of an implied warranty whenever a remote seller made an
express representation about its goods to a remote purchaser. 1
53
B. Third-Party Beneficiaries
After the Baughn case, the court in Touchet 154 reaffirmed a prior
decision allowing a nonprivity buyer to maintain an action for breach of
an implied warranty as a third-party beneficiary. In Kadiak Fisheries Co.
v. Murphy Diesel Co., 155 the plaintiff fishing company contracted to pur-
chase from an intermediary a motor manufactured by the defendant. The
manufacturer knew the identity and requirements of the remote pur-
chaser, built the motor to fit in the bed of one of the remote purchaser's
vessels, shipped the motor directly to the remote purchaser, made ad-
justments and corrections to the motor during its installation, and at-
tempted to correct problems that occurred with the motor after its instal-
lation. 56 The court concluded that under these circumstances, the inter-
mediary had purchased the motor on the basis that the
seller/manufacturer would provide a motor that was merchantable and fit
for the remote purchaser's purposes. 157 As a result, the remote purchaser
was a third-party beneficiary of any implied warranties of merchantabil-
ity and fitness imposed on the manufacturer. 58
supra note 60, the court discarded this common law warranty in Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash.
2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969), and adopted strict liability in tort. That liability was replaced by the
Washington Tort Reform Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72 (1981).
152. Baughn, 107 Wash. 2d at 151, 727 P.2d at 669 (citing Daughtry v, Jet Aeration Co., 91
Wash. 2d 704, 711,592 P.2d 631, 634 (1979); Berg v. General Motors Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 584, 594,
555 P.2d 818, 823-24 (1976)).
153. See infra text accompanying notes 189-194.
154. Touchet Valley Grain Growers, Inc. v. Opp & Seibold Gen. Constr., Inc., 119 Wash. 2d
334, 831 P.2d 724 (1992).
155.70 Wash. 2d 153, 422 P.2d 496 (1967).
156. Id. at 164-65, 422 P.2d at 503-04.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 165,422 P.2d at 504.
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Following the analysis in the Kadiak case, the court in Touchet held
that the plaintiff purchaser of a grain storage building was a third-party
beneficiary of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose imposed on the building's designer and component
supplier. 59 This status was in addition to the plaintiff being a third-party
beneficiary of the express warranties discussed above. 160 The court noted
that the designer/supplier knew the remote purchaser's identity, purpose,
and requirements, designed the building to the remote purchaser's speci-
fications, delivered the building's components to the remote purchaser's
site, and attempted to make repairs when the remote purchaser first en-
countered difficulties with the building.' 6 1
In some instances, finding that a third-party beneficiary contract ex-
ists where there is an implied warranty is not difficult. For example, if a
purchaser contracts with a seller for the latter to deliver a good to a third
person, performance by the seller in delivering a good that conformed to
an implied warranty would necessarily and directly benefit the third per-
159. 119 Wash. 2d at 347-48, 831 P.2d at 731. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Ap-
peals held in Evergreen that the owner of a building was the third-party beneficiary of implied war-
ranties arising out of a contract between a supplier of flooring material and a subcontractor that
installed the flooring in the building. Evergreen Inv. Group, L.L.C. v. Porter, No. 30664-6-11, 2004
WL 1732373 at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). The court found the facts in the case to be materially
indistinguishable from those in Kadiak and Toucher, noting that the supplier's president and CEO
inspected the place in the building where the flooring was going to be installed and learned the con-
ditions to which the flooring would be subjected. Id. The CEO also provided detailed instructions for
installing the flooring and personally delivered some of the flooring to the building. Id. On these
facts, the court ruled the building owner to be a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the
supplier and the flooring subcontractor. Id.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 80-86.
161. Support for the court's decision may be found in Bobb Forest Prod., Inc. v. Mobark In-
dus., 783 N.E.2d 560, 576 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (remote buyer third-party beneficiary where manu-
facturer knew remote buyer and manufactured sawmill to remote buyer's needs) and in Richards v.
Goerg Boat & Motors, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 1084, 1092 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (boat manufacturer's in-
volvement in sale of boat by distributor to remote buyer sufficient to characterize manufacturer as
seller to remote buyer). Further support may be found in People ex rel. Resnik v. Curtis & Davis,
Architects & Planners, Inc., 400 N.E.2d 918 (I11. 1980). There the defendant architectural firm con-
tracted to provide architectural services to the Illinois Building Authority for its construction of a
prison to be leased to the state. Id. at 918. Upon completion of the facility, the state sued the archi-
tects for breach of contract, a claim that was upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court on the ground that
the state was a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the Authority and the firm. Id at 920.
In that case, however, the contract between the Authority and the firm required the architects to
consult with the state concerning the project's requirements and to revise their drawings to the user's
satisfaction. Id. It also warranted to the Authority and the state that the rights granted under the con-
tract could be conveyed. Id. Moreover, the court cited the fact that the Authority was created by the
state to circumvent debt limitations placed on the state by its constitution, which apparently pre-
cluded the state from issuing debt to construct the facility as opposed to leasing it from the Author-
ity. Id. These facts make a stronger case for concluding that the state was a direct beneficiary of the
contract between the Authority and the firm.
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son, making that individual a third-party beneficiary. 62 The facts in the
Kadiak case are close to this example, although it appears that the inter-
mediary discharged its contractual responsibility to the plaintiff by in-
stalling the motor, albeit with some manufacturer assistance. 63 The facts
in Touchet are more attenuated since there the metal building designed
by the warrantor was apparently delivered to and erected by its immedi-
ate buyer in discharging the immediate buyer's duty to the remote buyer
of the building.1 64 Although the remote sellers in both cases knew the
identities and purposes of the remote buyers and designed the goods for
them, the immediate buyers could, prior to performance but in breach of
contract with their buyers, have resold the goods to someone other than
the remote buyers. In that case there would have been no direct obliga-
tion by the remote sellers to the remote buyers.' 65 Moreover, even if the
immediate buyers had performed their contracts with the remote buyers
by erecting or installing the goods, those contracts may have provided
that the goods were sold with no warranties, in which case the remote
buyers should have had no direct warranty obligations against the remote
sellers' 66 and no third-party beneficiary status. In either of these hypothe-
sized scenarios, the direct and necessary obligation of the remote seller to
the remote buyer, which is required for third-party beneficiary status, is
questionable at best. 167
Assuming that the remote buyers in the Kadiak and Touchet cases
were correctly determined to be third-party beneficiaries, the question
162. See Powers, supra note 134, at I 15.
163. See Kadiak Fisheries Co. v. Murphy Diesel Co., 70 Wash. 2d 153, 164-65, 422 P.2d 496,
503 (1967).
164. See 119 Wash. 2d at 337-39, 345-47, 831 P.2d at 726, 730. In the Touchet case the sup-
plier apparently delivered the building components to Opp & Seibold, the contractor that erected the
structure. Id. at 338, 831 P.2d at 726. In Kadiak, the manufacturer shipped the motor to the remote
buyer, although it is unclear whether the motor was delivered to the remote buyer as opposed to the
intermediary. 70 Wash. 2d at 164-65, 422 P.2d at 503.
165. Under WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-716 (2000), the remote buyers would have had a right
to specific performance of the contracts with their sellers if the goods were unique or there were
other proper circumstances.
166. See infra text accompanying notes 321-323; Powers, supra note 134, at 143-44.
167. Comment 3 to section 2-318 indicates that Alternative A of that section, the alternative
that has been adopted in Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-318, is not intended to restrict case
law extensions of express and implied warranties to additional persons in the chain of distribution.
See HAWKLAND, supra note 14, § 2-318:1; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 14, § 11-3. Thus the
Touchet decision could simply be an extension of implied warranties to certain remote buyers con-
sistent with comment 3 to section 2-3 18. That is not, however, what the court in that case or Kadiak
purported to do. Both Kadiak, a pre-Code case, and Touchet invoked traditional third-party benefici-
ary principles to justify their decisions, the latter by invoking section 62A. 1-103 of the Revised Code
of Washington, and designating the remote buyer as an intended beneficiary. See Touchet, 119
Wash. 2d at 346, 831 P.2d at 730. Accordingly, both decisions need to be examined under third-
party beneficiary law.
[Vol. 28:239
Remote Purchasers
remains as to which facts were indispensable to those determinations.1 68
In Daughtry,169 for example, where the court held that privity of contract
was required for a warranty claim, the manufacturer provided a new part
for the remote buyer's sewage treatment system when it failed. More-
over, given the character of the sewage treatment system, the manufac-
turer must have known the buyer's purposes in using the system and that
the buyer would benefit if the good conformed to the manufacturer's
warranties. Indeed, it has been contended that a manufacturer's warranty
is for the benefit of the end user or consumer whenever the manufacturer
knows that the intermediary to whom it sells its goods will not use or
consume them, 70 a position largely inconsistent with the privity re-
quirement and the reasons for retaining it.'7 '
Having appropriate and determinate criteria for deciding whether
performance under a contract would necessarily and directly benefit a
third party, and hence create enforceable contract rights in that party, is
particularly important when evaluating implied warranty claims. Unlike
express warranties, implied warranties are not part of the parties' agree-
ment in fact but are default obligations provided by the U.C.C.172 Be-
cause a warrantor incurs additional costs when a third party has enforce-
able warranty rights, 73 it is important that the circumstances indicate that
the promisee intends the promisor to assume direct contractual obliga-
tions to that party so that the promisor can price the increased obligation
into the bargain.' 74 Unless those circumstances exist, a default term that
168. In its unpublished opinion in Evergreen, the Court of Appeals found a significant differ-
ence between the facts in the case before it and those in Kadiak and Touchet in that the provider of
the flooring materials subject to the implied warranties did not attempt to repair the flooring after it
began to fail. Evergreen Inv. Group, L.L.C. v. Porter, No. 30664-6-I1, 2004 WL 1732373 at *4
(Wash. Ct. App. August 3, 2004). However, the court indicated that the supplier agreed to contact
the flooring subcontractor on the building owner's behalf about the problem with the flooring and
noted that the supplier was not the manufacturer of the flooring material, only the distributor. Id.
Why the latter factors were relevant the court did not explain.
169. 91 Wash. 2d 704, 592 P.2d 631 (1979).
170. See Powers, supra note 134, at 124.
171. See infra text accompanying notes 265-328.
172. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
173. See infra text accompanying notes 272-322.
174. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 44, at 662. In explaining why the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 302(b) (1981) requires the circumstances to indicate that the promisee intends to
give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance, the author states:
[T]he Restatement Second's ... additional requirement that the promisee have an inten-
tion to benefit the third person seems curious at first. No such additional requirement is
imposed in other situations in which a court is asked to supply a term. Nevertheless, it
makes sense if it is regarded as a factor in determining the intentions of the parties, for,
compared with such other situations, cases involving claims of beneficiaries are singular
in an important respect. If the parties bargain freely before they make their contract,
every additional term must be paid for .... [I]f nothing is said about liability to a third
person and a court is asked to supply a term making the other party liable to a third per-
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creates rights in a third party is likely to result in an obligation to a re-
mote buyer that the contracting parties would find suboptimal.' 75
Since a seller may modify or disclaim an implied warranty or limit
a remedy, 176 a remote seller could, of course, modify or disclaim any im-
plied warranty obligation to a third party or limit its remedy for breach to
avoid any potential suboptimal obligation. The costs of making such a
disclaimer, modification, or remedy limitation may be higher, however,
than for similar terms not involving third-party beneficiaries. 177 First, a
remote seller will have to determine whether it is necessary to make a
disclaimer, modification, or remedy limitation affecting a third-party
beneficiary.1 78 This decision will depend, in part, on the nature of the
criteria used in determining whether a remote buyer is a third-party bene-
ficiary, and hence the likelihood that third-party rights might be found to
exist. Second, if third-party beneficiary rights are likely to arise and a
limitation of those rights is optimal, the manner of disclaiming or modi-
fying an implied warranty or limiting remedies for breach may be more
costly. A third-party beneficiary's rights are measured by the terms of the
son, the matter is not so simple .... Why would one party have been willing to pay any-
thing at all in order to have the other party undertake such an obligation? The require-
ment of the Restatement Second that there be an indication "that the promisee intends to
give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance" seems designed to deal
with this question. It might be paraphrased to require an indication "that the promisee
would have been willing to pay the fair value for the promisor's undertaking a duty to the
beneficiary.
Id. See also Powers, supra note 134, at 75.
175. In Kadiak, for example, the manufacturer was held liable for lost profits and property loss
suffered by the remote buyer when the motor started a fire and delayed the latter's fishing opera-
tions. See Kadiak Fisheries Co. v. Murphy Diesel, Inc., 70 Wash. 2d 153, 167-68, 422 P.2d 496, 505
(1967). Ordinarily it is not efficient for a manufacturer to bear these third party consequential losses.
See COOTER, supra note 31, at 427-30.
176. See supra notes 6 and 11.
177. In addition to affecting the costs of making a disclaimer, enabling a remote buyer to sue a
remote seller for breach of warranty by removing the privity requirement is likely to prove costly, in
determining the cause of the buyer's loss, including increased error costs. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 272-280. Removing the privity requirement is also likely to be more costly and less accu-
rate in determining the existence and nature of any implied warranty than would be the case in an
action between a remote seller and its immediate buyer. See infra text accompanying notes 299-310.
178. A remote seller may not wish to make a total disclaimer of all implied warranties since its
immediate buyer may prefer an implied warranty should the immediate buyer be responsible to the
remote buyer for any nonconformity in the goods. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
Under the Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2304(4) (1975), a warrantor that gives a FULL war-
ranty may not restrict warranty rights to an immediate consumer buyer during the warranty period.
But a warrantor may provide that the duration of the warranty lasts only during the ownership of the
first purchaser. 16 C.F.R. § 700.6(b) (1977). If a warrantor provides for a FULL warranty of such
limited duration, there is no violation of the statute by the warrantor in not extending warranty rights
to a subsequent purchaser during the duration of the warranty since the warranty terminates on trans-
fer of the good to the subsequent purchaser.
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contract between the promisor and the promisee.17 9 Therefore, these
rights ordinarily are subject to the defenses that a promisor has against a
promisee.180
Consistent with the above principles, the Washington Court of Ap-
peals determined that the plaintiff in the Tex Enterprises, Inc. case could
not invoke implied warranty rights as a third-party beneficiary because of
a disclaimer in the manufacturer's invoice to its immediate buyer.' 81
Nevertheless, authority exists asserting that a disclaimer or warranty
modification affecting a third-party beneficiary must be communicated to
the beneficiary and not simply to the promisee. 182 Such a process is more
179. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 44, at 675-78.
180. Oman v. Yates, 70 Wash. 2d 181, 188-89, 422 P.2d 489, 495 (1967).
181. Tex Enterprises, Inc. v. Brockway Standard, Inc., 110 Wash. App. 197, 39 P.3d 362
(2002), rev'd on other grounds, 149 Wash. 2d 204, 66 P.3d 625 (2003); accord Powers, supra note
134, at 129-30 (remote buyer bound by modification or disclaimer of warranty in contract between
remote seller and its buyer). The court's determination is consistent with Comment I to section 2-
318 dealing with statutory third-party beneficiaries. A seller may not exclude or limit third-party
beneficiary rights under section 2-318, but it can disclaim or modify implied warranties or limit
remedies. Comment I states that "[t]o the extent that the contract of sale contains provisions under
which warranties are excluded or modified, or remedies for breach are limited, such provisions are
equally operative against beneficiaries under this section." U.C.C. § 2-318 (1966).
On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court refused to consider whether the warranty disclaimer
in the contract between the manufacturer and the distributor would have been effective against the
remote buyer given its decision that no implied warranty of merchantability existed from the manu-
facturer to that buyer. See Tex Enterprises, Inc., 149 Wash. 2d at 214 n.5, 66 P.3d at 630 n.5.
182. HAWKLAND, supra note 14, § 2:318; Nogay, supra note 134, at 894-95. Dean Hawkland
argues that direct notice to remote buyers is important because even though a remote seller may
disclaim all warranties in selling to its buyer, "the ultimate consumer may still be relying on the
manufacturer's good reputation in buying the goods." HAWKLAND, supra note 14, § 2:318. More-
over, he maintains that Comment I to section 2-318 allows warranty disclaimers against third-party
beneficiaries protected by that section so long as the exclusion is permitted by section 2-316. Id.
Because section 2-316 treats a disclaimer as a bargained-for term, it is only effective against those
who assent to it, including third-party beneficiaries. The problem with the first argument is that
reliance on a manufacturer's good reputation is not a basis for assuming that the entity purchasing
from the manufacturer initially, and the consumer buyer ultimately, have purchased an implied legal
obligation that the goods will have certain attributes and will provide certain legal remedies if those
attributes do not exist. Indeed, the opposite is the case. Dean Hawkland's second argument assumes
a third-party beneficiary is part of the bargain in fact that establishes the third-party beneficiary's
contractual rights, a status that is not consistent with a beneficiary's relationship to the bargain be-
tween a promisor and promisee. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 44, at 657-64, 673-78. Indeed, Dean
Hawkland's argument would appear to preclude course of dealing or course of performance between
a promisor and promisee from modifying or excluding an implied warranty extending to a third-
party beneficiary although section 2-316(c) provides for such modification or exclusion. Finally, his
argument does not account for the remainder of the comment quoted, supra note 181, which states
that disclaimers and remedy limitations in the initial contract of sale are equally applicable to third-
party beneficiaries.
Perhaps implicit in at least some of the arguments for notice of a disclaimer to a third-party
beneficiary is the assumption that the third-party beneficiary will not obtain what the beneficiary
bargained for unless that party receives notification of a disclaimer. That assumption is incorrect. If
there is an effective disclaimer or modification in the original contract between a remote seller and
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costly for a remote seller than utilizing a disclaimer or remedy limitation
in the agreement with its immediate buyer.183 Requiring a direct dis-
claimer to a third-party beneficiary would be even more costly in Wash-
ington because warranty disclaimers must be individually negotiated, 84
requiring the remote warrantor to obtain negotiated assent to a disclaimer
or modification.' 85
Given the significant risk that an implied warranty for a third-party
beneficiary may be suboptimal, it is preferable that the warranty be re-
stricted to contracts in which a remote seller performs directly to the
third party, a situation in which the seller clearly understands it is under-
its buyer, the price of their bargain will reflect exclusion or modification of the implied warranty.
When the immediate buyer from the remote seller sells to the remote buyer, the immediate buyer
will sell at a price at which the immediate buyer's marginal cost equals marginal revenue. See AN-
DREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 135-47 (1995); WALTER NICHOLSON, IN-
TERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATION 229-30 (4th ed. 1987). With a disclaimer of
an implied warranty by the remote seller, an implied warranty from that seller will not be in the
bundle of attributes sold to the remote buyer, and the price paid by the remote buyer will be lower
than if there had been no disclaimer. Cf Holdych & Mann, supra note 127, at 842-47 (discussing
adjustments to a product's price as information is discovered as indicating that a representation
constituting a warranty is false). From the price of the bundle of attributes sold to the remote buyer,
there is no reason to believe that individual has paid for an implied warranty from the remote seller
and therefore deserves to have such a warranty enforced absent a disclaimer to the third party.
183. Nogay, supra note 134, at 895, contends that a remote seller can provide for notice to the
remote buyer by requiring that the seller to the latter include a disclaimer on the former's behalf,
requiring the seller to the remote buyer to indemnify the remote seller for any loss resulting from
failure to make the disclaimer. Nogay does not discuss the enforcement costs of such a regime or
how a disclaimer by the immediate seller would be communicated to someone such as the second-
hand purchaser in Morrow v. New Moon Homes, 548 P.2d 279, 282 (Alaska 1976), discussed infra
in text accompanying notes 272-276. Moreover, he fails to address the effect of a warranty modifi-
cation or disclaimer by an initial remote purchaser on a secondhand purchaser. In the Lidstrand case,
for example, the original retail purchasers of a mobile home, manufactured by the warrantor, en-
countered difficulties with the home, and the warrantor attempted to effectuate repairs. Lidstrand v.
Silvercrest Indus., 28 Wash. App. 359, 362, 623 P.2d 710, 713 (1981). Assume that the manufacturer
and original retail purchasers disputed the efficacy of the repairs and the manufacturer paid the pur-
chasers a sum of money in exchange for complete discharge of all of the manufacturer's responsi-
bilities under the warranty. When the mobile home was then sold to the second-hand purchasers,
would the manufacturer have to inform those buyers, whose identity it may not know, that the war-
ranty had been discharged, or could it rely on the terms of the discharge with the original retail pur-
chasers? See Powers, supra note 134, at 143-44.
184. See, e.g., Cox v. Lewiston Grain Growers, Inc., 86 Wash. App. 357, 365, 936 P.2d 1191,
1196 (1997); Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 256, 257-59, 544 P.2d 20, 22-23
(1975); Dobias v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 6 Wash. App. 194, 200, 491 P.2d 1346, 1350 (1971).
185. Similar to the argument by Nogay, supra note 134, at 895, one could contend that a re-
mote seller can provide for negotiation of a disclaimer or modification of a warranty with a remote
buyer by requiring that the immediate seller to the remote buyer conduct such negotiation on the
remote seller's behalf. The immediate seller would be required to indemnify the remote seller for
any loss resulting from failure to negotiate a disclaimer with a remote buyer. One might assume that
this process would be even more costly and subject to dispute than simple notification of a remote
buyer of a remote seller's disclaimer since more factual issues would surround the question of
whether such a negotiation occurred.
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taking a responsibility to a third party. If parties to a contract prefer re-
mote seller responsibility to a third party, they can contract for the re-
mote seller to provide a pass-through warranty to the remote buyer or
include a term conferring third-party beneficiary status on a remote pur-
chaser, as in the Jeffery case. 186
C. Implied Warranties Based on Express Representations
to Remote Buyers
In Tex Enterprises, Inc.,187 the Washington Court of Appeals found
a basis for another exception to the privity requirement for an implied
warranty claim. As indicated previously, the plaintiff purchased contain-
ers from a distributor after the defendant manufacturer's representative
met with and told him that the containers were as good as the ones the
plaintiff was then using. Importantly, the manufacturer sold the contain-
ers to the distributor using an invoice that contained an express warranty
against defects, a disclaimer of all other express and implied warranties,
and a limitation of remedies. The appellate court held that the manufac-
turer's contact with and direct representations to the plaintiff remote pur-
chaser were sufficient not only to create an express warranty but also to
create an implied warranty independently of the contract between the
contractor and distributor.' 88 Thus, the implied warranty did not emanate
186. 39 Wash. 2d 855, 859, 239 P.2d 346, 348 (1952).
187. 110 Wash. App. 197, 39 P.3d 362 (2002), rev'don other grounds, 149 Wash. 2d 204, 66
P.3d 625 (2003)
188. Id. at 203-04, 39 P.3d at 366. An analogous approach to finding a warranty of merchant-
ability accompanying an express warranty is found in two cases and in a highly respected treatise.
See, e.g., Century Dodge, Inc. v. Mobley, 272 S.E.2d 502, 504 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980); Blankenship v.
Northtown Ford, Inc., 420 N.E.2d 167, 169-71 (111. App. Ct. 1981); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note
14, § 12-3. According to those authorities a warranty by description involves a warranty that a good
will have attributes consistent with merchantability. If, for example, an express warranty describes a
good as a "hay baler," and the good possesses the physical attributes of a hay baler, but the good
does not bale hay, there is a breach of the express warranty even if it effectively disclaimed all im-
plied warranties. Id. In Universal Drilling Co. v. Camay Drilling Co., 737 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1984),
the court refused to apply this analysis to a contract for the sale of two used drilling rigs. Despite a
disclaimer of all implied warranties, the buyer contended that the seller breached an express war-
ranty by description in delivering two oil rigs that would not function. Id. at 873. Rejecting the pur-
chaser's argument, the court found that the warranty disclaimers clearly reflected the parties' agree-
ment to transfer equipment that may have needed to be repaired to be operable, that accepting the
argument would preclude the parties from making such an agreement, and that the warranty by de-
scription assured the buyer that it would receive a good that possessed the physical properties con-
tained in the description. Id. at 873-74.
The court's treatment of the warranty by description approach in Universal Drilling is correct.
See Fletcher, supra note 43, at 416-17. The alternative approach makes it excessively costly for
parties to bargain for warranty attributes they desire. As in Universal Drilling, the parties may desire
to contract for a good that has certain physical attributes, such as being a drill or a car, but want to
allocate to the purchaser all risks involving the fitness of the good for any ordinary or particular
purposes.
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from the manufacturer to the distributor and then extend to the remote
buyer. Rather, it was a warranty obligation dependent only on the manu-
facturer's contact with and express representations to the plaintiff buyer.
The Washington Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals'
analysis on two bases. 89 First, the court relied heavily on a textual analy-
sis of U.C.C. sections 2-314 and 2-315, referring to the fact that the two
sections specify respectively that the warranty of merchantability is "im-
plied in a contract for their sale" and that the warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose arises based on a seller's understanding "at the time of
contracting."'90 By contrast, the court noted that section 2-313, which
deals with the creation of express warranties with less demanding privity
requirements, does not mention the term "contract." 191 Thus, according to
the court, the plain meaning of these sections require that a person seek-
ing to enforce a warranty either be a party to a contract of sale or a third-
party beneficiary of such a contract. 192 From a policy perspective, the
court maintained that an implied warranty must be based on an underly-
ing contract because contractual relationships under the U.C.C. must be
formed according to U.C.C. safeguards, "making contractual relation-
ships comparatively formalized."'' 93 On the other hand, representations
that may be deemed express warranties under section 2-313 require no
formalities, making potential remote seller warrantors unable to predict
when implied warranties would arise if the law were to permit such war-
ranties to be based solely on representations constituting express warran-
ties. 194
189. Tex Enterprises, Inc., 149 Wash. 2d at 204, 66 P.3d at 625. Support for the Supreme
Court's decision may be found in Hyundai Motor America, Inc. v. Goodin, 804 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004). There, an automobile purchaser sued the manufacturer for breach of its standard written
express warranty and the implied warranty of merchantability. Id. at 778. The purchaser argued that
privity for the implied warranty existed based on the manufacturer's express warranty. Id. at 788.
Rejecting the argument, the court differentiated between warranty attributes for which there was
privity between the manufacturer and the remote buyer, those in the express warranty, and those for
which there was not, those in an implied warranty. Id. "[T]o the extent that a manufacturer's express
warranty of a product undoubtedly frequently acts as an inducement to purchase that product, such
inducement only reasonably extends to the terms of the express warranty itself." Id.
190. U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (2001).
191. Tex Enterprises, Inc., 149 Wash. 2d at 211-13, 66 P.3d at 629. The court distinguished the
language in section 2-3 13 governing express warranties. The language of that section does not, ac-
cording to the court, refer to an underlying contract. Id. The problem with the court's analysis is that
it does not analyze the terms "seller" and "buyer" in section 2-313, both of which indicate that the
section restricts warranties to an entity in a contractual relationship with a warrantor. See note 16,
supra.
192. Tex Enterprises, Inc., 149 Wash. 2d at 211-13, 66 P.3d at 629.
193. Id. For the latter proposition the court cited section 2-201 which requires that all contracts
for the sale of goods for more than $5,000 must be in writing to be enforceable. Id.
194. Id.
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The court's reliance on sections 2-314 and 2-315 to require privity
of contract is consistent with the analysis of those sections discussed
previously. 195 The court's invocation, however, of safeguards or formali-
ties required by the Code to form a contract is less persuasive. The Code
has discarded some of the common law's formal requirements for con-
tract formation. Offer and acceptance are no longer required to establish
the existence of a contract, which under section 2-204 may be made in"any manner sufficient to show agreement." Moreover, the terms in a
written acceptance need not be the same as those in an offer to create a
contract, so long as there is an expression of acceptance that is not ex-
pressly conditional on assent to additional or different terms.' 96 The only
section cited by the court as a safeguard or formality for contract forma-
tion under the Code is section 2-201, which requires the existence of a
writing to make enforceable a contract for the sale of goods whose price
is $500 or more. But section 2-201(c) provides that a contract that does
not satisfy the section's writing requirement is enforceable with respect
to goods for which payment has been made and accepted or which have
been received and accepted. Such conditions are likely to exist in many,
if not most, cases involving disputes over implied warranties.
A formality or safeguard that differentiates implied warranties from
express warranties in Washington is the one required by the Tex Enter-
prises, Inc. court, an underlying bargained-for exchange.' 97 The bar-
gained-for exchange that underlies a contract of sale may be perceived as
cautioning a seller, not only that its promise is enforceable, 198 but also
that a variety of default terms, such as implied warranties and remedies,
may accompany a transaction, governing issues not dealt with by the par-
ties. On the other hand, a seller's mere express representation, which, as
the court points out in Tex Enterprises, Inc., may be made under informal
circumstances, may not generate the same expectations with respect to
the existence of collateral default terms.
Support for the Washington Court of Appeals decision in Tex En-
terprises, Inc.199 may be found in an article by Professor Curtis R.
195. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
196. U.C.C. § 2-207 (2001).
197. Consideration for the enforcement of a promise exists when there is a bargained-for ex-
change, which exists when 1) a promisor gives its promise in exchange for a return promise or per-
formance and 2) the promisee gives its promise or performance in exchange for the promisor's
promise. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 72 (1981).
198. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800 (1941); RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.2, at 99-101 (6th ed. 2002).
199. The suggested amendments to new sections 2-313A and 2-313B might not alter the result
in the Tex Enterprises, Inc. case itself. Section 2-313A deals with a representation contained in a
record accompanying the goods, such as a label on or a warranty card in a package. Section 2-313B
pertains to representations in an "advertisement or similar communication to the public." The repre-
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Reitz.200 Professor Reitz suggested amending proposed revisions to Arti-
cle 2 of the U.C.C. on remote seller obligations 20 1 to provide that a seller
who makes a representation about its goods breaches its obligation to a
remote buyer not only if the goods fail to conform to the representation
but also if the goods are unfit for the ordinary purposes for which they
are used. 2  In other words, an implied obligation of fitness would arise
whenever a remote seller makes a representation concerning its goods for
which it would be responsible to a remote buyer.20 3 Although the pro-
posal formally would pertain to representations in a record accompany-
ing the goods or in a communication to the public, Professor Reitz sug-
gested that the recommended change would apply more broadly to any
representation made by a manufacturer to retail buyers.0  At least theo
sentation in Tex Enterprises, Inc. appears to have been made in a private communication to the re-
mote buyer although it may have been one that was communicated to other similarly situated buyers.
If made in a private communication, the representation appears not to be enforceable under the literal
terms of the amendments to Article 2. Amended section 2-313, which is a revision of that existing
section, applies only to express warranties made to an immediate buyer, and Baughn and Touchet
rely on previous section 2-313 as the basis for finding an express warranty in favor of a remote
buyer. Baughn v. Honda Motor Co. Ltd., 107 Wash. 2d 127, 152, 727 P.2d 655, 669 (1986); Touchet
Valley Grain Growers, Inc. v. Opp & Seibold Gen. Constr., Inc., 119 Wash. 2d 334, 347-48, 831
P.2d 724, 731 (1992).
200. Reitz, supra note 16.
201. See supra note 105.
202. Reitz, supra note 16, at 393.
203. Elsewhere Professor Reitz maintains that courts should differentiate between transactions
in which a manufacturer is known to and extends an express warranty to consumer buyers and those
in which a manufacturer's goods are sold under a retailer's brand name, the manufacturer's identity
is not disclosed to retail buyers, and the manufacturer makes no express warranty to retail buyers.
CURTIS R. REITZ, CONSUMER PRODUCT WARRANTIES UNDER FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS § 8.03, at
118-25 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter CONSUMER PRODUCT WARRANTIES]. In the former transactions
the privity requirement ought to be eliminated for the implied warranty of merchantability as well as
for any express warranty. Id. In the latter, the privity requirement ought to be retained. Id. The rea-
son for the difference in treatment of the two situations appears to be predicated on the manufac-
turer's perceived involvement in the sale to the retail consumer and the latter's reliance on the manu-
facturer's identity in assuring that the goods are merchantable. There are two problems with Profes-
sors Reitz's differentiation. First, section 2-314 imposes no reliance requirement by a buyer on the
identity or character of the seller. Second, under the comparative advantage theory of warranties, the
question whether a warranty should arise in a transaction depends on whether a buyer values the
attributes in question more highly than the cost of producing them and whether the warrantor can
provide the attributes or insure against their absence more cheaply than can the buyer. See text ac-
companying supra note 34. Thus, in determining whether it is efficient to eliminate the privity bar-
rier and provide for an implied warranty of merchantability, the relevant questions include whether
the warrantor can provide the attributes of merchantability in a cost effective manner and more
cheaply than can the buyer and not whether the buyer knows the warrantor's identity.
204. CONSUMER PRODUCT WARRANTIES, supra note 203, § 8.03, at 118-25. As Professor
Reitz points out, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12, precludes any warran-
tor, id. § 2301(5), that gives a written Magnuson-Moss warranty, id. § 2301(6), from modifying or
disclaiming any implied warranties, id. § 2301(7), that arise under state law, id. § 2308(a). A dis-
claimer or modification in violation of the Act is ineffective, including under state law. 15 U.S.C. §
2308(c). The statute does not apply to oral warranties such as that in the Tex Enterprises, Inc. case.
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retically, therefore, it would apply to a manufacturer's personal represen-
tation to a remote buyer as in Tex Enterprises, Inc. The rationale for the
proposal is to give "fuller meaning to express warranties" made by
201manufacturers to protect remote buyers from nonconforming goods.
Although justified as giving a "fuller meaning" to a remote seller's
express warranty, Professor Reitz's proposal does not involve ascribing a
meaning to an express representation, for that is the process of interpreta-
tion.20 6 Rather, the proposal involves adding a default term. Unlike other
default terms, however, this term would be added, not where the parties
have failed to provide a term governing their relationship, 20 7 but to an
express term whose attributes have been determined by a remote seller.
Unless it reduced transaction costs, which is unlikely, this default term
would make the use of discrete warranty terms more costly. A remote
seller that simply seeks to warrant some limited attributes of a good, such
Tex Enterprises, Inc. v. Brockway Standard, Inc., 110 Wash. App. 197, 39 P.3d 362 (2002), rev'd on
other grounds, 149 Wash. 2d 204, 66 P.3d 625 (2003). Moreover, the disclaimer or modification
prohibition applies only to the extent that an implied warranty arises under state law. Although there
is authority to the contrary, see, e.g., Szajna v. General Motors Corp., 503 N.E.2d 760, 769 (Il1.
1986), a majority of cases hold that the Act does not remove privity requirements that exist under
state law. See Carlson v. General Motors Corp., 883 F.2d 287, 291 (4th Cir. 1989); Abraham v.
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 795 F.2d 238, 249 (2d Cir. 1986); Plagens v. National RV Holdings,
Inc., 328 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1073 (D. Ariz. 2004); Walsh v. Ford Motor. Co., 588 F.Supp. 1513,
1525-26 (D.D.C. 1984); Hamdan v. Land Rover North America, Inc., 51 U.C.C. Rep.Serv.2d (CBC)
1024, 1024 (N.D.1. 2003); Kutzle v. Thor Industries, Inc., 51 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.2d (CBC) 141, 141
(N.D. 111. 2003); Hyundai Motor America, Inc. v. Goodin, 804 N.E.2d 775, 788-89 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004). Therefore, if state law requires privity of contract between a warrantor and consumer, and
privity does not exist, the disclaimer or modification provision does not apply.
The prohibition in 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) against a disclaimer of an implied warranty if a warran-
tor makes a Magnuson-Moss warranty is premised on Congress's perception that such disclaimers
are deceptive. As stated by the court in Abraham:
Prior to passage of Magnuson-Moss, the common practice of many sellers was to provide
a written warranty that offered minimal protection and disclaimed all implied warranties.
This practice often placed the consumer in a worse contractual position than if no war-
ranty at all had been given, because implied warranty protection under the Uniform
Commercial Code is often more extensive than the express warranty given by a seller.
Because the very term "warranty" implies an increase in contractual protection to con-
sumers, warranties that were largely disclaimers were in a real sense misleading.
795 F.2d at 247.
The contention that any express warranty under section 2-313 would be misleading if accom-
panied by a disclaimer does not appear to be accurate, given the range of informal representations
that constitute warranties under that section. Moreover, applying the deception rationale to all sales
in which express warranties are given would preclude parties from allocating risks involving product
attributes in a manner they deem optimal. For example, a sale by description that the good were a
hay baler would preclude the seller from disclaiming the warranty that the good would function as an
ordinary hay baler. See supra note 188.
205. Reitz, supra note 16, at 393-94.
206. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 200 (198 1).
207. Id. at § 204 ("when parties to a bargain ... have not agreed with respect to a term.., a
term which is reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court").
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as its dimensions or physical description, would be deemed to incur a
more pervasive implied obligation about the product's fitness; 20 8 an obli-
gation whose costs might exceed its benefits.
20 9
To avoid making this broader commitment, the seller would have
two choices. First, the seller could disclaim the obligation, which would
be quite costly generally for many informal representations, such as the
one in Tex Enterprises, Inc., and particularly costly in Washington where
individual negotiation of warranty disclaimers is required.210 Second, if a
warranty disclaimer is too costly and the expected cost of providing the
implied obligation exceeds the value of the desired express representa-
tion, the remote seller will not provide the latter representation, a conse-
quence that will make both the remote seller and the remote buyer worse
off. Given the fact that the proposed implied obligation would attach to
an express term, the transaction costs should be low for a remote seller to
simply add a fitness warranty to its express representation.21 ' Indeed, if
such a fitness warranty is an optimal one between a remote seller and
remote buyer, one would expect the seller to make it just as such sellers
frequently make express guarantees against defects to remote buyers. A
remote seller who fails to include such an obligation that is preferred by
the market would be foregoing gains from trade just as it would if it
failed to provide an express warranty against defects demanded by the
market.21 2
V. THE PRIVITY REQUIREMENT AND ITS UTILITY
As the forgoing analysis demonstrates, a remote buyer's ability in
Washington to assert express and implied warranty claims against a re-
mote supplier is based on exceptions to the privity requirement. In his
dissent in Daughtry,213 Justice Rosellini argued for abolition of privity in
warranty actions generally:
208. See Hyundai Motor America, Inc., 804 N.E.2d at 788 (refusing to find privity of contract
between manufacturer and remote buyer for implied warranty of merchantability based on manufac-
turer's written express warranty because inducement to purchase by express warranty extends only
to its terms).
209. See Priest, supra note 30, at 143-46 (discussing the reasons some manufacturers disclaim
the implied warranty of merchantability).
210. See supra note 6; Reitz, supra note 16, at 394-95 (manufacturer express warranties that
may be created in advertisements and communications to the public are not in form that permits
meaningful negation of implied fitness obligation).
211. This cost should be particularly low for pass-through warranties contained on or in the
container with the goods.
212. See R. H. Coase, The Choice of the Institutional Framework, 17 J. L. & ECON. 493, 494
(1974) (explaining why a monopolist or oligopolist will provide the same contract terms, other than
price, as a seller in a competitive market in order to maximize its net return on sales).
213.91 Wash. 2d 704, 712-20, 592 P.2d 631,635-39 (1979).
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I do think the time is appropriate to recognize that where a manu-
facturer makes express warranties about his product or places it on
the market to be used for a certain purpose, his warranties, express
or implied, should run to the consumer, the person who is expected
to use the product.2
1 4
This Part examines arguments against the privity requirement. Prior
to analyzing those by Justice Rosellini, this Part addresses several con-
tentions concerning the continued viability of an immediate seller and
incentives for strategic behavior and fraud purportedly generated by the
privity requirement. This Part then evaluates the merits of Justice
Rosellini's arguments and examines the consequences of abolishing the
privity requirement.
A. The Viability of an Immediate Seller and Incentives for
Fraud and Strategic Behavior
The first two arguments against the privity requirement are interre-
lated, pertaining to the continued viability or availability of the immedi-
ate seller and the supposed incentive that that seller's lack of availability
or viability creates for the remote seller to engage in strategic behavior.
The first argument is that eliminating the privity requirement protects
remote buyers from product defect losses suffered when immediate sell-
ers become insolvent or discontinue business.21 5 Although such losses
may occur, the inability of a remote buyer to enforce a warranty claim
against its seller does not mean that the privity requirement should be
abolished. When a buyer purchases a product, he or she buys not only the
physical good but also the seller's or some third party's warranty com-
216mitment. It is the credit of the seller or other warrantor that provides
214. Id at 713-14, 592 P.2d at 635-36. At the end of his opinion, however, Justice Rosellini
said that he would hold that a remote buyer could sue a manufacturer where the latter made repre-
sentations by advertising, brochures, or otherwise when the customer suffered a loss caused by the
failure of a good to perform as represented, a narrower ruling than that justified by preceding parts of
his opinion. Id. at 720-21, 592 P.2d at 639. Justice Rosellini did not indicate that a remote buyer
must have been aware of a representation in order to sue on an express warranty, which was the rule
adopted in Baughn. The facts in the Daughtry case do not indicate whether the remote buyer was
aware of a brochure and owner's manual that contained the express warranties on which the remote
buyer was suing.
The amended section 2-318(2) Alternative C provides for extension of an express or implied
warranty to any immediate buyer who may reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected
by the goods subject to the warranty and who is injured by breach of the warranty. A remote seller
may, however, exclude or limit the operation of the section except with respect to personal injuries.
See U.C.C. § 2-318(2), alt. C (2004). This extension of warranty is the position advocated by Justice
Rosellini.
215. See Nogay, supra note 134, at 888.
216. See Holdych & Mann, supra note 127, at 794-96 (discussing warranties as product attrib-
utes); Bruce D. Mann & Thomas J. Holdych, When Lemons Are Better Than Lemonade: The Case
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the warranty upon which the buyer at least implicitly relies in purchasing
the warranty, 217 and it is the value of a seller's warranty that is embedded
in the price that the buyer pays for the good.21 8 If a remote seller does not
provide an express warranty to a remote buyer and the privity require-
ment bars other warranty claims by the latter against the former, there is
no warranty constituting a credit obligation of the remote seller that is
included in the price paid by the remote buyer.
In addition, as discussed below, 2 19 it is not obvious that removing
the privity barrier is optimal between a remote seller and a remote buyer.
Moreover, to the extent removal of the privity limitation is optimal, in-
cluding for reasons involving the potential unavailability of immediate
sellers, remote sellers can provide express warranties to remote buyers, a
phenomenon that is ubiquitous in today's marketplace. 22° As a corollary,
if abolition of the privity requirement is appropriate to protect against
immediate-seller solvency risks, it is questionable whether the law
should allow remote sellers to disclaim warranties or include warranty
modifications that preclude their extensions to remote buyers. 221 Finally,
remote buyers bear credit risks other than those pertaining to warranties
with respect to their immediate sellers who become insolvent or are oth-
erwise unavailable when they prepay for goods 222 or lose the ability, de-
rived from customer accommodation, to return conforming but person-
ally undesirable goods to a seller for a refund.
Against Mandatory Used Car Warranties, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. I, 31-32 (1996) (discussing
third party warranties provided in sale of used cars).
217. In the sale of used cars, buyers may purchase warranties sold by used car dealers or by
third party warrantors. Mann, supra note 216, at 3 1-32. Quite obviously, a used car purchaser who
obtains a warranty or service contract from a third party relies on the creditworthiness of that entity
rather than the dealer in meeting its warranty obligations.
218. Holdych & Mann, supra note 127, at 791-96.
219. See infra text accompanying notes 272-320.
220. Manufacturer new car warranties clearly remove the risk of dealer insolvency as a matter
both of contract law and of laws, such as the Washington Lemon Law, that place direct obligations
on manufacturers that provide express warranties to consumer buyers. See WASH. REV. CODE §
19.118.041 (1987) (automobile manufacturer that makes a warranty and fails to conform a noncon-
forming vehicle to the warranty within a reasonable number of attempts must repurchase the vehicle
or provide the consumer with a replacement).
221. See 16 C.F.R. § 700.6(b) (1977) (Magnuson-Moss warrantor may provide that the dura-
tion of a warranty lasts only during the ownership of the first purchaser); Lidstrand v. Silvercrest
Indus., 28 Wash. App. 359, 361-65, 623 P.2d 710, 713-14 (1981) (express warranty extended to
second hand purchasers since terms did not restrict warranty to original owner); BARKLEY CLARK &
CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT WARRANTIES § 10.02(2) (1984) (warrantor able to
restrict warranty to first purchaser).
222. The Bankruptcy Code, I I U.S.C § 507(a)(6) (1994), grants priority to the unsecured claim
of a buyer up to $1,800 for the deposit of money with a bankruptcy debtor in connection with the
acquisition of property or services for personal, family, or household purposes that were not deliv-
ered or provided. The priority is limited to $1,800, is subject to other priorities, and, of course, de-
pends in value on the assets in the debtor's estate. Id. § 507.
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The second argument was broached by the court in Nobility Homes
of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers,223 in refusing to impose the privity requirement
for the implied warranty of merchantability. "To hold otherwise," the
court reasoned, "would encourage manufacturers to use thinly capitalized'collapsible corporations' to sell their commercially inferior products
leaving no one for the buyer to sue for his economic lOSS. ' ' 224 In reality,
this quasi-fraudulent behavior does not appear to be one in which many
remote sellers would engage. Most sellers are interested in ongoing or
repeat sales of their products to the market and would be concerned that
knowledge of this buyer-injuring behavior would adversely affect such
sales. 25 Moreover, remote sellers frequently are creditors of their dis-
tributors,226 and the selection of poorly capitalized distributors imposes
additional costs on the sellers. In addition, the argument has no validity
to many remote sellers, such as component suppliers, who do not sell to
distributors but to other manufacturers for inclusion of their product in
another good. Finally, if the risk posited is a significant one, mere aboli-
tion of the privity requirement probably would be insufficient to protect
against it. Rather, courts would have to invalidate remote seller warranty
disclaimers as unconscionable,22 7 including those that are conspicuous
and individually negotiated,228 to protect against the possibility that such
disclaimers would be vehicles for the deceptive behavior.
The third argument for removing the privity barrier is that it allows
manufacturers to hide behind the requirement to engage in unprovable
fraud about product defects by misrepresenting or failing to disclose hid-
den defects. 229 To the extent such behavior exists, however, the problem
does not appear to result simply or even primarily from the privity re-
quirement. Rather, the problem stems from the disclaimability of implied
warranties. 230 If a manufacturer with asymmetrical access to information
223. 557 S.W.2d 77, 81-83 (Tex. 1977).
224. Id. at 81-82. As authority for its assertion, the court cited E.F. Roberts, The Case of the
Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL L. REv. 835, 836 (1967), which
mentions the risk of dealing with a collapsible corporation that goes out of business, but does not
discuss the strategic behavior to which the court referred.
225. Cf George Akerloff, supra note 29, at 499-500 (sellers of brand name goods subject to
consumer retaliation if the quality of goods does not meet expectations); Michael R. Darby & Ed
Kari, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 73, 81-82 (1973)
(fraudulent provision of services results in loss of goodwill and reduces price seller can charge for
product).
226. HONNOLD, supra note 12, at 559.
227. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2001); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 14, § 4-6 (discussing uncon-
scionable warranty disclaimers).
228. See supra note 6 for warranty disclaimer requirements in Washington.
229. Speidel, supra note 8, at 47.
230. See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L. J. 763, 767
(1983).
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knows of latent defects in its goods and either lies or fails to disclose
such information to buyers, disclaimers of warranties covering such de-
fects are not efficient.23' Unlike some other types of transactions,232 how-
ever, manufacturers' sales of goods do not generally involve asymmetri-
cal access to information about existing product defects that would en-
able a manufacturer to engage in the fraudulent issuing of disclaimers.233
More importantly, the argument appears to ignore the existence of mar-
ket forces to deter such fraud. Economists differentiate among product
attributes based upon when they may be discovered.234 Search attributes
are those product characteristics that a buyer can discover prior to pur-
chase.235 Experience attributes are ones that can only be discovered
through use of a product, and credence attributes are characteristics
whose existence is very costly to ascertain.236 For latent defects of which
a manufacturer is aware but that are discoverable by remote buyers
through product use, that is, experience attributes, it is reasonable to be-
lieve that such buyers would discover the defects and discipline the mis-
creant manufacturer by refusing to purchase subsequent goods from it. 23
7
As a result, such fraud is unlikely to be a long-term successful manufac-238turer strategy.
231. Id. That a disclaimer covers latent defects ordinarily is simply an allocation of the risk of
such defects to a buyer. See Salt River Project Agr. Imp. & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 694 P.2d 198, 213 (Ariz. 1984). Section 1-103(b), however, allows evidence of fraud under
supplementary principles of law even though there is a disclaimer. See HAWKLAND, supra note 14, §
2-316:1; Torrance v. AS & L Motors, Ltd., 459 S.E.2d 67 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (disclaimer of im-
plied warranty did not preclude evidence of misrepresentation constituting an unfair or deceptive
trade practice).
232. Kronman, supra note 230, at 767-69 (arguing that asymmetries in access to information
by lessor and lessees of real property justify a rule prohibiting disclaimers of the implied warranty of
habitability in a lease of residential property).
233. Id. at 769 n.28 (indicating that asymmetry of information about product defects generally
does not exist since a manufacturer's knowledge about its defects is merely probabilistic, as is that of
a consumer).
234. Darby, supra note 225, at 68-69; Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL.
ECON. 729 (1974).
235. Darby, supra note 225, at 68-69.
236. Id.
237. See Akerloff, supra note 29, at 499-500; Darby, supra note 225, at 72 (the greater the
discrepancy between promised and actually experienced attributes, the less likely customers will do
business with firm); POSNER, supra note 198, § 4.1, at 94 (contracting party known not to keep
promises penalized by future refusals to deal).
238. A different case is presented if the fraud involves credence attributes whose existence is
costly to ascertain. See Darby, supra note 225, at 70-77 (analyzing consumer and supplier behavior
with respect to supplier fraud involving credence attributes). For these attributes, the relevant issue
in the perpetration of fraud is not privity, but rather the ability of a seller, including an immediate
seller with whom there is privity of contract, to make representations that are costly to verify.
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B. Justice Rosellini's Dissent in Daughtry
In Daughtry,239 Justice Rosellini raised numerous objections to the
privity requirement. He maintained that a loss from breach of warranty
should be placed upon the party "to whom the ultimate gain inures, 240
an argument apparently predicated on avoiding unjust enrichment. 241
However, existing law already allows a remote buyer to obtain a restitu-
tionary-like remedy against a remote seller in limited situations. This
remedy is not strictly restitutionary since the remote buyer does not pay
the price to the remote seller, and the amount for which the remote seller
is liable is likely greater than the price received from its buyer.242 Under
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, a buyer who purchases a product
with a "full" Magnuson-Moss warranty243 is entitled to a refund of the
purchase price from the warrantor if the latter fails to remedy any defects
in the product after a reasonable number of attempts at repair. 244 Simi-
larly, under Washington State's "Lemon Law, 245 a new motor vehicle
purchaser with a manufacturer's express warranty may obtain a replace-
ment vehicle or refund of the purchase price from a warrantor if the war-
rantor is unable to conform the vehicle to the warranty after a reasonable
number of attempts.2 46
239. 91 Wash. 2d 704, 712-20, 592 P.2d 631, 635-39 (1979).
240. Id. at 719-20, 592 P.2d at 639.
241. Id. Professor Richard Speidel also posits unjust enrichment as one of the bases for extend-
ing a remote seller's warranty to a remote buyer. Speidel, supra note 8, at 46. He maintains that if a
remote buyer has paid a "sound" price for unmerchantable goods to its seller, and the latter, through
the chain of distribution, has paid a "sound" price for the unmerchantable goods to the remote seller,
there are grounds for "reversing [the] unjust enrichment" obtained by the remote seller and extend-
ing its implied warranty of merchantability to the remote buyer. Id. Such extension is considered
particularly appropriate where the immediate seller has gone out of business, is insolvent, or has
disclaimed all warranties. Id.
242. See Fletcher, supra note 43, at 441.
243. 15 U.S.C. § 2303 (1975).
244. 15 U.S.C. § 2304 (1975).
245. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.118.005-904(1987).
246. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.118.041. Authority in an apparent minority of jurisdictions sup-
ports allowing a remote buyer to revoke acceptance of nonconforming goods and obtain a refund of
the price from a remote seller under section 2-608. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Harper, 671 F.2d
1117, 1126 (8th Cir. 1982) (implied warranty of merchantability); Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports,
Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977) (express warranty); Guerdon Industries, Inc. v. Gentry, 531 So.
2d 1202, 1206 (Miss. 1988); Fode v. Capital RV Center, Inc., 575 N.W.2d 682 (N.D. 1998) (express
warranty); Gochey v. Bombardier, Inc., 572 A.2d 921 (Vt. 1990) (express warranty); Murray v.
Holiday Rambler, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1978) (express warranty); CLARK, supra note 221, §
7.03(3)(d). Contra Voytovich v. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc., 494 F.2d 1208, 1211 (6th Cir.
1974); Seekings v. Jimmy GMC, 638 P.2d 210, 214 (Ariz. 1981); Conte v. Dwan Lincoln-Mercury,
Inc., 374 A.2d 144, 148 (Conn. 1976); Henderson v. Chrysler Corp., 477 N.W.2d 505, 508 (Mich.
App. 1991); Gasque v. Mooers Motor Car Co., Inc., 313 S.E.2d 384 (Va. 1984); Fletcher, supra note
43, at 402-05, 468-69; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 14, §8-4.
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A buyer's right to recover back the price in the situations cited
above differs in at least one crucial respect from eliminating the privity
requirement to avoid unjust enrichment. When the remote buyer is able
to recover the price, the remote seller either made a guarantee to the re-
mote buyer against nonconformities in the goods 247 or undertook to pro-
vide a remedy in case the goods failed to meet designated specifica-
tions. 248 That commitment was embedded in the price paid by the remote
buyer as one of the attributes purchased in the bundle of attributes sold
with the goods.249 Where a remote seller makes no such express guaran-
tee to the remote buyer, and the privity rule applies, no commitment from
the remote seller is sold to the remote buyer. The remote buyer thereby
assumes the risks of nonconformities for which the remote seller will not
be responsible, undermining the unjust enrichment argument.25°
247. See 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(A) (defining written warranty as affirmation or promise which
"affirms or promises that such material or workmanship is defect free or will meet a specified level
of performance over a specified period of time"); 15 U.S.C. § 2304 (providing for refund of price
when warrantor that has given a full warranty fails to repair defects within reasonable number of
attempts). WASH. REV. CODE § 19.118.041 (providing for return of price by new motor vehicle
manufacturer who has made express warranty to consumer buyer). Of the cases allowing a remote
buyer to revoke acceptance against a remote seller under section 2-608, most appear to involve an
express warranty made by the remote seller to the remote buyer. See Durfee, 262 N.W.2d 349; Fode,
575 N.W.2d 682; Gochey, 572 A.2d 921; Murray, 265 N.W.2d 513. At least two, however, allow
revocation based on a breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. See Harper, 671 F.2d at
1126; Guerdon, 531 So. 2d at 1206.
248. See 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(B) (defining written warranty as including "undertaking in writ-
ing . . . to refund, repair, replace, or take other remedial action with respect ... in the event such
product fails to meet the specifications set forth in the undertaking).
249. Holdych & Mann, supra note 127, at 791-96.
250. Although he concedes that a remote buyer may bear the risks of not having a warranty
claim against a remote seller, Professor Richard Speidel argues that the indirect marketing system
reduces the chance that the remote seller and remote buyer will negotiate and properly allocate the
risks of product defects. Speidel, supra note 8, at 47. The assumption that the risks involved will not
be appropriately allocated because of the costliness of direct negotiations is misplaced. Remote
sellers-manufacturers, for example-currently deal with risks encountered by remote buyers that
such sellers can prevent or insure against more cheaply than buyers can by providing express war-
ranties. See Priest, supra note 30, at 1307-13, 1328-43 (analyzing manufacturer express warranties
under comparative advantage theory of warranties). Remote sellers that warrant products against
defects in materials and manufacture, for example, would expressly guarantee remote buyers that
their products were merchantable if the sellers could sell the warranty at a price exceeding their
costs. See supra text accompanying note 212. Thus, the failure of remote sellers' express warranties
to include attributes such as merchantability implies an allocation of risk to remote buyers that any
warranty of that nature is provided, if at all, by the remote buyer's immediate seller.
As to the argument by Professor Speidel that a remote buyer has paid a "sound" price for un-
merchantable goods, supra note 241, the buyer has not paid a price that includes a guarantee by the
remote seller. Thus, when the seller to a remote buyer disclaims all warranties, becomes insolvent, or
goes out of business, no right against the remote seller applies since the remote buyer has not pur-
chased such a right. The argument that warranties ought to be extcnded to remote buyers to reallo-
cate the risks involving immediate sellers means primarily that a new attribute should be included in
the bundle of attributes sold by the immediate seller to the remote buyer. This attribute is a warranty
obligation by the remote seller.
Remote Purchasers
Justice Rosellini also maintained that the responsibility for a loss
ought to be "upon the party whose product created the loss. 2 51 Develop-
ing this argument from an efficiency perspective, Professor Richard
Speidel has argued that a manufacturer is in the best position to ensure its
goods conform to its express representations and that, as a merchant, the
manufacturer is expected to know the relevant standards of merchantabil-
ity and the probability that its goods will conform to those standards. 52
As the entity in control of the goods, Professor Speidel has asserted, the
manufacturer is the least cost avoider253 in assuring that the goods con-
form to these standards, and its failure to do so increases the total cost of
loss avoidance and of any losses ensuing from failure of the goods to
conform to these standards.254
Although Professor Speidel is correct in his contention that a re-
mote seller is in the best position to assure that its goods conform to its
express warranty or insure the warrantee against loss, it does not neces-
sarily follow that the privity requirement should be eliminated. Consid-
erations discussed hereinafter indicate that privity is appropriate for a
proper allocation of loss 255 and that remote seller liability to remote buy-
ers should be restricted to express commitments made from the former to
the latter or to commitments of which the latter is a third-party benefici-
ary.256 Moreover, given Professor Speidel's efficiency analysis of the
implied warranty of merchantability, it is curious that remote sellers so
frequently disclaim the warranty and that such disclaimers persist in and
are accepted by the market. Perhaps the best explanation for such behav-
ior stems from the character of the warranty. U.C.C. section 2-314 pro-
vides that merchantable goods "must be at least such as," among other
criteria, are fit for the "ordinary purposes" for which such goods are
used. Absent some outside referent, the standard of merchantability is
vague and indeterminate. 257 It is therefore costly to determine whether
the warranty has been breached. Furthermore, since the ordinary pur-
poses of goods are determined by the trier of fact-frequently a jury-
there is a substantial risk of error costs. The trier of fact may determine
251. Daughtry v. Jet Aeration Co., 91 Wash. 2d 704, 718, 592 P.2d 631, 638 (1979).
252. Speidel, supra note 8, at 47.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33 indicating that a seller will warrant certain
product attributes when, in addition to other conditions, the seller can provide the attributes more
cheaply than the buyer can. In that situation, the seller is the lowest cost provider of the attributes.
254. Id.
255. See infra text accompanying notes 272-322.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 62-105.
257. See Mann, supra note 216, at 37; E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES
AND MATERIALS 245-47 (4th ed. 1995) (recounting that the warranty of merchantability stated in
section 2-314 is, according to one lawyer, "a very broad, subjective standard that juries can interpret
to mean that buyer is entitled to relief if buyer is dissatisfied in virtually any way with the product").
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that a nonordinary use is in fact an ordinary use. This risk is greater with
products that have a range of potential uses, such as motor vehicles . 58
With these costs, the warranty of merchantability is not efficient in many
markets.2 59
Requiring privity of contract does not mean that the cost of or re-
sponsibility for a nonconforming good will not fall on a remote supplier.
Market discipline, resulting in the loss of goodwill by remote suppliers
who sell nonconforming goods, is likely to reduce their sales and cause
260such sellers to take cost-effective measures to avoid nonconformities.
In addition, remote sellers may be subject to indemnification actions by
their immediate purchasers to the extent the latter are responsible for
losses caused by nonconforming goods. 26 1 Further, section 2-607(5) al-
lows a party with whom a remote buyer is in privity to vouch in262 a re-
mote supplier who is responsible for the nonconforming goods. 263
The preceding responses answer as well Justice Rosellini's conten-
tion that it is more appropriate to allow a remote buyer to proceed against
a manufacturer than a retailer who has little knowledge of a product's
attributes and has high inspection costs.264 This argument assumes a rela-
tionship in which a remote supplier, such as a manufacturer, sells a
ready-to-market product to an intermediary that acts as a mere conduit to
the ultimate buyer, selling the item to the ultimate user in the same con-
dition in which it was received from the remote seller. This conception of
the marketing of a good is inappropriate in many instances, especially for
258. See Priest, supra note 30, at 1344-46. Even if there is no implied warranty against a re-
mote or any other seller, market discipline resulting from competition provides a strong incentive for
the seller to provide goods that are in fact merchantable. See Holdych & Ferrell, supra note 6, at 271.
259. Professor George Priest found that disclaimers were more prevalent from the manufactur-
ers of some goods than others. Priest, supra note 30, at 1345-46. He attributed that difference in the
frequency of disclaimers to the different uses to which goods might be put, positing that disclaimers
were more frequent with goods that have more potential uses. Id.
260. Cf Akerloff, supra note 29, at 499-500; Darby, supra note 225, at 73, 81-82 (discussing
loss of goodwill and reduced prices from fraudulent provision of services); Benjamin Klein & Keith
B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615
(1981); POSNER, supra note 198, § 4.1, at 94. The taking of cost-effective measures to eliminate
nonconformities by remote sellers does not mean that remote sellers' products will be defect free.
Defects will continue to exist that cannot be eliminated in a cost-effective manner. Moreover, dis-
putes will continue concerning whether goods were defective when sold by remote sellers or whether
problems with the goods arose from handling or use by a subsequent party, such as a retail seller. See
infra text accompanying notes 272-274.
261. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
263. See also infra text accompanying note 325 for the court's solution in Tex Enterprises Inc.
v. Brockway Standard, Inc., 110 Wash. App. 197, 39 P.3d 362 (2002), rev'd on other grounds, 149
Wash. 2d 204, 66 P.3d 625 (2003), to the problem of remote sellers escaping responsibility for their
goods.
264. Daughtry v. Jet Aeration, Inc., 91 Wash. 2d 704, 719-20, 592 P.2d 631, 638-39 (1979).
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265goods for which there is likely to be an action for breach of warranty.
In such circumstances, entities subsequent to the remote sellers in the
chain of distribution frequently modify or prepare the goods for sale to
the ultimate purchaser. 266 Preparing a good for sale to the end purchaser
may be undertaken at the direction and under the control of a remote
seller, making the entity performing the preparations the remote seller's
agent.267 In that case any nonconformities arising from the preparation
may properly be attributable to the remote seller. On the other hand,
modifications or handling that produce problems with a good may not be
pursuant to the direction or under the control of the remote seller and
may occur at a number of places in the ultimate distribution of the good.
Such third-party processing or handling of goods occurred in both
the Daughtry and Touchet cases. In Daughtry, the remote seller manufac-
tured a sewage system that one of its distributors sold to a third party.
The third party then sold the system to the remote purchaser and installed
268it on his property. In the suit against the remote seller for the system's
failure, the principal issue at trial was whether the plaintiffs problems
were attributable to a defect in the defendant's system or to inadequate
drainage, a problem that may have been caused by the system's installa-
269tion. In Touchet, the plaintiff contracted with an independent contrac-
tor to build a grain storage building, and the latter contracted with the
remote seller to design the building and fabricate its parts.270 When the
building began to collapse, there was evidence of faulty design or con-
271struction, the latter apparently performed by the plaintiff's contractor.
265. Given the costs of suing for breach of warranty and the unavailability of attorneys' fees
except in limited circumstances, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (consumer who prevails in civil action
under Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (2000) (person injured by
violation of Consumer Protection Act), most actions will be brought where substantial economic loss
is involved for items such as mobile homes, automobiles, boats, etc., and not for packaged goods on
a remote seller's shelf. See Reitz, supra note 16, at 358. For the prior items, a dealer may be likely to
take actions in preparing goods for sale or store them in a manner that may affect the condition in
which they are received by the ultimate purchaser.
266. See CONSUMER PRODUCT WARRANTIES, supra note 203, § 8.03, at 118-25. Professor
Reitz concludes: "A manufacturer's product, whether a component or a larger assembly, can and
frequently does undergo change before the retail sale to the complaining buyer." Id.
267. Cf HONNOLD, supra note 44, at 326; Thompson Farms, Inc. v. Como Feed Prods., Div. of
Nat. Oats, 366 N.E.2d 3, 11-12 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (distributor agent in sale of hog houses where
distributor agreed to promote sale of houses on manufacturer's behalf and subject to its specifica-
tions and where manufacturer authorized and consented to distributor's production plan with buyer).
Cf Candlelight Homes, Inc. v. Zomes, 414 N.E.2d 980, 982 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (mere manufac-
turer-distributor relationship does not establish agency for implied warranty of merchantability).
268. 91 Wash. 2d at 706-707, 592 P.2d at 632.
269. Id.
270. 119 Wash. 2d at 338, 831 P.2d at 725.
271. Id. at 338-39, 831 P.2d at 725.
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The problem with abrogating the privity requirement involving the
marketing of goods that are subject to later processing, modification, or
handling is exemplified most vividly by Morrow v. New Moon Homes,
Inc. 272 There, the plaintiffs purchased a used mobile home from a mobile
home retailer who did not appear to have any relationship to the manu-
facturer defendant. Someone, perhaps the original seller, modified the
home, modifications that included installing a stove pipe for an oil fur-
nace that had replaced the manufacturer's electrical furnace.273 Shortly
after purchasing the home, the plaintiffs noticed numerous problems,
including windows and doors that were out of square, interior walls that
did not fit together, and an exterior that had substantial leakage. In an
action against the manufacturer for breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability, the retailer having gone out of business, the court held
that the plaintiffs could sue the manufacturer for breach of warranty de-
274spite an absence of privity. The court's opinion contained no evidence
of the condition of the home when delivered to the dealer who sold the
home to the initial buyers. Moreover, it does not appear which, if any, of
the problems were attributable to a breach of warranty by the manufac-
turer and which were caused or contributed to by the maker of the modi-
fications or by the handling or processing of the home by either the origi-
nal dealer or the retailer who sold the home to the plaintiffs.
Admittedly, at trial after remand by the Alaska Supreme Court, the
plaintiffs had to prove that the manufacturer breached its warranty and
that the breach caused the plaintiffs' loss. The manufacturer could intro-
duce evidence that the loss did not result from a breach of the manufac-
turer's implied warranty of merchantability. 275 Obtaining and producing
evidence pertaining to these issues is, however, likely to be costly. This
is particularly so when suit is brought by a secondhand purchaser, as in
Morrow, and the issues involve not only the original condition of the
goods when delivered by the manufacturer but also the nature of any
modifications and usage of the goods and the extent to which they con-
272. 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976). The case presents not only the problem of conduct by the
initial or subsequent retail sellers who may have caused or contributed to the loss, but also that of
intervening retail buyers whose conduct may have had similar consequences.
273. Id. at 281. Apparently, the retailer who sold the home to the plaintiffs acquired it some-
time thereafter. Information about how long and under what conditions the retailer retained the home
prior to sale to the plaintiffs does not appear in the court's opinion.
274. Id. at 291-292.
275. As discussed infra in text accompanying notes 301-306, the manufacturer could also
introduce evidence that the implied warranty of merchantability had been disclaimed or was limited
by the manufacturer's description of the home to the original purchaser.
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tributed to or caused the loss. 27 6 The cost of obtaining this evidence, to-
gether with the risk that a trier of fact will misassess the cause of the loss,
increases the error costs in determining warranty claims against the re-
mote seller. Forcing purchasers to sue their immediate sellers is likely to
minimize these error costs by causing the parties who have the cheapest
access to the relevant evidence to obtain it and then either vouch in277 or
implead 278 a remote seller. This reduction in error cost, together with
other costs discussed hereinafter, 279 is likely to reduce overall warranty
enforcement costs. 280
276. See Reitz, supra note 16, at 380-81 (extending remote seller implied warranty of mer-
chantability to second-hand purchaser in retail market might encourage claims by the latter that
might be defended at considerable expense).
277. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
278. WASH. SUP. CT. Civ. R. 14.
279. See infra text accompanying notes 288-319.
280. Professor Epstein points out that the relevant question is whether the privity rule increases
or decreases total warranty enforcement costs. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LAW 14-15 (1980). Those costs include not only the costs of litigating warranty claims but also the
costs of erroneous decisions that different enforcement rules produce. See id. Elimination of the
privity requirement may minimize total litigation costs by reducing the number of suits. But in as-
sessing those litigation costs, one has to take into account the effects of the vouching rule of section
2-607(5) and impleader rules such as Washington Superior Court Civil Rule 14. On the other hand,
elimination of the privity requirement is likely to increase the costs of erroneous determinations. In
another writing, Professor Epstein argues against the privity requirement for products liability cases:
The general attack on the privity limitation rests on an important error of undergenerali-
zation. The typical cases in which the issue is raised involve ordinary consumer goods
sold at retail .... Within this context the privity doctrine is quite unappealing because the
immediate seller is typically a passive conduit of a product that is designed and prepared
by others.
Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Worker's Compensation Law,
16 GA. L. REV. 775, 807 (1982).
As can be seen, Professor Epstein's argument in favor of abolishing the privity requirement is
premised on the immediate seller being a passive conduit for the sale of a good. He then maintains
that privity is appropriate when a workman seeks to impose liability on a manufacturer of a machine
tool purchased by his or her employer. In that instance it is rare for the employer to be a mere con-
duit between the manufacturer and the employee since machines frequently are customized or main-
tained by employers, id., phenomena comparable to that for many goods that are the subject of war-
ranty suits by purchasers such as in Morrow. If most purchaser warranty actions were for the sale of
prepackaged goods for which the immediate seller was a mere conduit, then abolition of the privity
requirement, at least on the basis of decreasing enforcement costs, would probably be justified. It is
much less likely so when other parties have processed the goods.
Given these potential error costs, the question exists why a remote seller, such as a manufac-
turer, would make an express warranty to a remote buyer. Part of the answer turns on the nature of
many if not most such warranties and the remedies they provide. Most manufacturer warranties are
against defects in manufacture and workmanship, items limited and within the manufacturer's
knowledge and control. Moreover, many durable goods warranties, for example by automobile
manufacturers, require periodic inspection and maintenance of the good during the warranty period
to protect against buyer misuse. Remedies are quite limited, generally to repair or replacement of
defective parts or defectively installed parts, and they exclude liability for consequential damages.
The first determination with respect to whether there has been a breach of warranty is made by either
the manufacturer or an agent and not by some third party. Even if the manufacturer erroneously
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 28:239
The court in Morrow28' and Justice Rosellini in Daughtry282 cited,
as one of the reasons for allowing a remote buyer to sue a manufacturer,
the desire to avoid circuitous litigation, that is, an action by a remote
buyer against its seller followed by a suit by the seller against a remote
supplier. For a number of reasons, however, a direct action by the remote
buyer against a remote seller is not appropriate. First, the costs of circui-
tous litigation are reduced by U.C.C. section 2-607(5), which provides a
significant incentive for a remote seller to defend the initial action by a
remote buyer against its seller.283 These costs are further reduced by im-
pleader rules, 284 which allow an intermediate seller to implead the remote
seller as a third-party defendant when sued by a remote buyer. Moreover,
a remote seller can eliminate the costs of circuitous litigation by making
an express warranty to a remote buyer, as the court recognized in Tex
Enterprises, Inc.,285 or by making the remote purchaser a third-party
beneficiary of its warranty to its immediate purchaser.8 6 Second, allow-
determines that the product conformed to the warranty, there is no liability for consequential dam-
ages unless the remedy limitation is deemed unconscionable or fails of its essential purpose. See
U.C.C. §§ 2-302, 2-719(2) (2001).
281. 548 P.2d at 289. The Alaska Court objected to circularity of litigation on the ground of
waste ofjudicial resources and not an increase in total overall costs. Id. From an efficiency perspec-
tive, the goal is to maximize total value minus total social costs and not simply judicial costs. Cf
George L. Priest, Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Nonconforming Goods Under the Uniform
Commercial Code. An Economic Approach, 91 HARV. L. REV. 960, 962 n.5 (1982); NICHOLSON,
supra note 182, at 521-22 (discussing need to include total social cost in determining efficient level
of output); ROY F. RUFFIN & PAUL R. GREGORY, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMicS 229 (2d ed.
1986) (discussing inefficiencies resulting from externalities when marginal benefit is less than total
marginal social cost). Moreover, it is curious how the court would respond to a remote seller's modi-
fication of the implied warranty of merchantability that limited its enforcement to the seller's imme-
diate buyer. Cf supra note 178. If the modification complied with the requirements of section 2-316
and were not unconscionable under section 2-302, it is doubtful that a court could refuse to enforce
the limitation even though it might lead to circularity of litigation as a result of a remote buyer hav-
ing to sue its seller, which would then have to sue its immediate seller. To be sure, courts may adopt
rules such as the one requiring that contract terms be reasonably certain, RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1981), to prevent contracting parties from shifting negotiating costs onto the
public, POSNER, supra note 198, § 4.2. Nonetheless, it is curious for courts to create contractual
obligations that increase the costs to the parties in order to reduce public enforcement costs.
282. 91 Wash. 2d at 718, 592 P.2d at 638.
283. Under section 2-607(5), the seller to the remote buyer may give the remote seller notice of
the suit by the remote buyer against it. If the notice informs the remote seller that it may come in and
defend the action and that, if it does not, it will be bound in any action by the seller against the re-
mote seller by any factual determination common to the two litigations, the remote seller is bound by
those factual determinations unless the remote seller defends the action by the remote buyer against
its seller.
284. WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 14.
285. 149 Wash. 2d 204, 213-14, 66 P.3d 625, 630 (2003).
286. One can expect a remote seller to make such an express warranty where, among other
things, it reduces total costs to the remote seller, the immediate buyer, and the remote buyer-
particularly the immediate buyer who otherwise might have to litigate two actions. To the extent
none of the three bore the public expense of an additional lawsuit, one would not expect they would
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ing a remote buyer to maintain a direct action against a remote seller is
likely to decrease the value of defenses a remote seller otherwise would
have against its immediate buyer, thereby increasing the cost of the sale
to the immediate buyer in a potentially inefficient manner.287 Section 2-
607(3) requires a buyer to give a seller reasonable notice of breach or be
barred from any remedy. 28 8 If a remote buyer is able to sue a remote sup-
plier for breach of warranty, there is a substantial likelihood either that
the reasonable notice period will be extended in a manner disadvanta-
geous to the remote supplier 289 or that notice to the remote supplier will
be eliminated altogether. 290 Either consequence, but particularly the lat-
ter, would be prejudicial to a remote supplier in seeking to minimize any
losses resulting from nonconformities with its goods, in negotiating a
settlement, in preparing to defend a suit, or in protecting against a stale
provide for such an express warranty to avoid such an expense. Cf POSNER, supra note 198, § 4.2
(parties try to shift negotiating costs onto courts)
287. The fact that a direct action by a remote buyer against a remote supplier would raise the
costs of the original transaction between the supplier and its immediate buyer does not make such a
direct action inefficient. Rather, such an action is inefficient only if it does not maximize total value
and increases total social cost. See supra note 281. If such an action maximizes total value and low-
ers total social costs-for example by increasing appropriate incentives for remote suppliers to take
cost-effective measures to provide conforming products, or by reducing litigation costs in amounts
greater than the increased costs of direct remote buyer actions-direct actions by remote buyers
would not be inefficient.
288. See supra note 9.
289. Comment 4 to section 2-607(3) states that a reasonable time for a consumer buyer is to be
judged by a different standard from that applied to a merchant buyer. According to the comment, the
purpose of the notice requirement is to defeat commercial bad faith and not deprive a good faith
consumer of a remedy. The problem with the comment is that the section requires notice in a "rea-
sonable time," not in a time consistent with good faith. The latter standard does not focus on the
reasonableness or cost effectiveness of the notice in terms of the cost to the buyer of giving notice
compared to the cost of not receiving timely notice to the seller, but rather on a consumer buyer's
honesty in fact. Courts are more generous in excusing delays in notification by consumers. See Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc v. Wheeler, 586 S.E.2d 83 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (two year delay in notification not
unreasonable as a matter of law); Maybank v. S.S. Kresge Co., 273 S.E.2d 681 (N.C. 1981) (three
year delay in notification not unreasonable as a matter of law). Harry G. Prince, Overprotecting the
Consumer? Section 2-607(3)(a) Notice of Breach in Nonprivity Contexts, 66 N.C.L. REV. 107, 126
(1987) (courts more generous with consumers in determining whether delay in giving notice is rea-
sonable).
290. McKnelly v. Sperry Corp., 642 F.2d 1101, 1107 (8th Cir. 1981) (notice requirement does
not apply to third-party beneficiary of warranty sustaining personal injuries); Cooley v. Big Horn
Harvestore Sys., Inc., 813 P.2d 736, 741 (Colo. 1991) (third party need not give notice to manufac-
turer); Tomczuk v. Town of Cheshire, 217 A.2d 71 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1965); Chaffin v. Atlanta Coco
Cola Bottling Co., 194 S.E.2d 513 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972); Malawy v. Richards Mfg. Co., 501 N.E.2d
376 (111. Ct. App. 1986) (manufacturer, not seller, entitled to notice by remote purchaser); Frericks v.
General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 460, 463 (Md. 1976) (third-party beneficiary of warranty need not
give notice of breach); Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. Watpro, Inc., 474 N.W.2d 605, 609-10
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (notice required only to immediate seller); RONALD A. ANDERSON, 4 ANDER-
SON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607:128. Contra Wilcox v. HiL.L.C.rest Mem'l Park
of Dallas, 696 S.W.2d 423, 424-25 (Tex. App. 1985); Prince, supra note 289, at 138-39, 143-44.
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claim. 29 1 Similarly, the statute of limitations in section 2-725(2) may be
longer with respect to an action by a remote purchaser. Authority is di-
vided on the question of whether breach of warranty occurs and the stat-
ute of limitations begins to run on tender of delivery of the goods to the
remote purchaser or to the immediate purchaser. 292
More significantly, a remote seller may have sold the goods to its
immediate buyer either with no warranty or with one significantly differ-
ent from that contemplated by a remote buyer. With respect to an express
warranty, a remote supplier's affirmation or description under section 2-
313 may not have been part of the basis of the bargain between the sup-
plier and its immediate buyer if, for example, the latter knew the repre-
293sentation was false. For instance, in Royal Business Machines, Inc. v.
Lorraine Corp.,294 a buyer purchased copy machines from a manufac-
turer over an eighteen-month period to lease to its customers. The manu-
facturer made a number of representations concerning the copiers' attrib-
utes. When the copiers failed to possess these attributes, the buyer sued
for breach of warranty. On appeal from a judgment for the buyer, the
appellate court held that the trial court erred in failing to ascertain the
buyer's knowledge concerning the veracity of the seller's representations
since the buyer may have acquired knowledge over the eighteen-month
period that certain of the representations were false. 29 5 According to the
court, "[t]he same representations that could have constituted an express
warranty early in the series of transactions might not have qualified as an
express warranty in a later transaction if the buyer had acquired inde-
pendent knowledge as to the fact asserted. 296 Thus, as to each purchase,
the buyer's state of knowledge had to be established.297 If the buyer's
lessees or subvendees had been able to sue the manufacturer based on the
representations, it would have been necessary to prove in which purchase
from the manufacturer the copier in question had been acquired and what
the buyer's state of knowledge was at the time of that purchase. Such
evidence probably would have been cheaper to obtain in an action be-
291. Cf Prince, supra note 289, at 116 (articulating the specific purposes identified by the
courts as being served by the section 2-607(a)(3) notice requirement).
292. See Heller v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 477 N.E.2d 434 (N.Y. 1985) (statute of limitations
runs from date of tender by remote seller not tender to remote buyer). See, e.g., Berry v. G. D. Searle
& Co., 309 N.E.2d 550, 554 (111. 1974); Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 512 P.2d 776, 778-79
(Or. 1973) (time of tender to remote buyer in action for personal injuries); Patterson v. Her Majesty
Indus., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 425, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
293. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 569 (3rd Cir. 1990); Coffee v. Ulysses
Irr. Pipe Co., 501 F. Supp. 239, 242 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
294. 633 F.2d 34 (7th Cir. 1980).
295. Jd. at 41, 45.
296. Id. at 44.
297. See id
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tween the manufacturer and its immediate buyer than in an action be-
tween the manufacturer and a remote buyer.298
With respect to an implied warranty, the contract between a remote
seller and its buyer may affect both the existence and character of any
such warranty. As discussed previously, authority is divided on the ques-
tion,299 with the Court of Appeals in Tex Enterprises, Inc.300 holding that
a remote buyer is bound by a disclaimer of an implied warranty con-
tained in the contract between a manufacturer and its immediate pur-
chaser. To return to the facts in the Morrow case, the mobile home
manufacturer's contract with its purchaser may have contained a dis-
claimer of implied warranties that complied with the requirements of
section 2-316(2),301 or the immediate buyer may have been given an op-
portunity to inspect the home.3°2 Such an inspection may have revealed
some of the defects involved in the case. Further, the purchaser may have
otherwise known of defects in the home prior to purchase,30 3 or a course
of dealing might have modified or excluded an implied warranty.30 4
If the Alaska Supreme Court in Morrow followed the disclaimer
rule adopted by the Washington Court of Appeals in Tex Enterprises,
Inc. ,3 5 any one of these factors should have modified or disclaimed an
implied warranty to the remote buyers. Even if the original transaction
did not result in a disclaimer of implied warranties, the manufacturer
may have described the home in a manner such as "factory second,"
298. Evidence pertaining to that issue may be more costly to obtain in an action by the remote
buyer against the remote seller since it would involve evidence about the immediate purchaser, an
entity that might no longer exist, as in the Morrow case, or from whom evidence might be difficult to
obtain.
299. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
300. 110 Wash. App. 197, 39 P.3d 362.
301. The court in Morrow opined that: "Our decision today preserves the statutory rights of the
manufacturer to define his potential liability to the ultimate consumer, by means of express dis-
claimers and limitations..." Morrow v. New Moon Homes, 548 P.2d 279, 292 (Alaska 1976).
302. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b) (2001) ("When the buyer before entering into the contract has exam-
ined the goods or the sample or model fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there
is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to
have revealed to him.").
303. Scheibe v. Fort James Corp., 276 F. Supp. 2d 246, 252 (D. Del. 2003) (purchaser's
knowledge of defects precludes implied warranty of merchantability).
304. § 2-316(3)(c).
305. Although the Alaska Supreme Court did not specify whether a disclaimer in a contract
between a remote seller and its immediate buyer would be effective against a remote buyer, the court
indicated that a disclaimer would have to meet the Code's requirements of conscionability. Morrow,
548 P.2d at 292. On this issue, the court stated that "close judicial scrutiny is warranted when a
manufacturer exacts a liability disclaimer or remedy limitation from a consumer who enjoys little or
no bargaining power in the market place." Id. at 292 n.43. The court's caution concerning uncon-
scionability clearly suggests that a disclaimer affecting a remote buyer would have to be effectuated
between a remote seller and that buyer and not in the contract between the remote seller and its
buyer.
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which would have determined the character of the implied warranty
given to the immediate purchaser. 30 6 Abrogation of the privity require-
ment should have meant only that the remote purchasers could enforce
the implied warranty against the manufacturer based on the latter's de-
scription to its buyer and not on a different description in the buyer's
contract with the initial retail purchaser.30 7 Although a remote purchaser
might not receive direct evidence of a remote seller's description or dis-
claimer and might develop different expectations concerning the remote
seller's warranty obligation, the price the remote buyer ought to pay
should, absent misrepresentation by its immediate seller, reflect and have
embedded in it the description or disclaimer by the remote seller. 308
Moreover, even if a remote buyer is restricted to the implied war-
ranty that is properly imposed on a remote seller, determination of any
issues concerning the nature of an implied warranty by a remote seller,
including potential course of dealing between that seller and its immedi-
309ate buyer, probably is more accurately and cheaply accomplished in an
action between that seller and its immediate buyer. Finally, to the extent
a remote purchaser can successfully sue a remote seller for breach of an
express or implied warranty that did not exist or for an implied warranty
different from that purchased by the immediate buyer, the remote sup-
plier will include the expected cost of this warranty liability in the sale to
its immediate purchaser. Such a result will change their bargain in a
suboptimal manner.310
A remote seller's damages might be substantially different in a
breach of warranty action by a remote buyer than they would be in an
action by an immediate buyer. Under section 2-714(2), a buyer suing for
breach of warranty is entitled to damages for direct economic loss meas-
ured by the difference in value of the goods accepted and the value they
306. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a), cmt. 2 (2001) (merchantability based on contract description). See
Reitz, supra note 16, at 392.
307. See U.C.C. § 2-318, cmt. 2 (1966) (purpose of section on third-party beneficiaries is to
give certain beneficiaries the same warranty which the buyer received in the contract of sale). One
proposal to extend express and implied warranties to remote buyers would restrict a remote seller's
obligation to the remote buyer to the enforceable terms of the original warranty and preclude en-
forcement of a remote seller's warranty if the description of the goods in the contract between the
remote purchaser and its seller were inconsistent with the description in the remote seller's warranty.
Reitz, supra note 16, at 399. Determining the original description of the goods or the enforceable
terms given by the remote seller to its buyer might not be possible, as might have been the case in
Morrow, 548 P.2d 279.
308. See supra note 182 (discussing the effect of a remote seller's disclaimer of warranty on
the price paid by a remote buyer to its seller).
309. See § 2-314(3) (implied warranties may arise from course of dealing and usage of trade);
§ 2-316(3)(c) (implied warranty excluded by course of dealing or usage of trade).
310. If a full implied warranty or an express warranty were optimal, one would assume that
such terms would have been in the original contract.
[Vol. 28:239
2005] Remote Purchasers
would have had if they had conformed to the seller's warranty. 31 A re-
mote seller could be liable for significantly higher damages if a remote
buyer can maintain an action for breach of warranty, and the difference
in value is based on the retail market and not on the market in which the
remote seller sold the good.312 The appropriate value to measure damages
resulting from direct economic loss is that based on the market in which
the seller sells the goods, since that value provides the appropriate incen-
tive for the seller to assure that the goods have the warranted attributes or
to insure against their absence.
A further risk of increased damages to a remote seller derives from
the fact that, as discussed previously, goods that may be subject to an
action for breach of warranty frequently are modified or prepared for sale
by those who are in privity with remote buyers. 31 3 To the extent the value
311. "The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and place of
acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had
been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount."
U.C.C. § 2-712(b) (2001).
312. See Reitz, supra note 16, at 118-19; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 14, § 11-5. This
difference in the measure of damages under section 2-714 may, however, be reduced substantially by
the immediate buyer's right to consequential damages under section 2-715 or to indemnification for
damages for which the buyer is obligated to a third party. See supra notes 90-97. Where a warrantor
has reason to know that its breach of warranty will result in its buyer suffering losses on transactions
with third parties or being liable to third parties for breach of contract, the warrantor may be liable
for these losses by its buyer. See U.C.C. § 2-715, cmt. 6 (2001); Nat'l Controls Corp. v. Nat'l Semi-
conductor Corp., 833 F.2d 491 (3rd Cir. 1987) (buyer entitled to recover lost profits as consequential
damages for breach of warranty where seller knows or has reason to know goods are being bought
for resale); Rock Creek Ginger Ale Co., Inc. v. Thermice Corp., 352 F. Supp. 522, 525, 530 (D.D.C.
1971) (manufacturer liable to distributor for damages for which distributor was liable to remote
buyer); DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION §
12.3 (1973). This liability may include damages that the immediate buyer has incurred, measured by
the remote buyer's lost benefit of the bargain. See Rock Creek Ginger Ale Co., 352 F. Supp. at 525;
DOBBS, supra. The liability for losses to an immediate buyer for its losses on collateral transactions
involving remote buyers is likely to be reduced by a clause excluding liability for consequential
damages incurred by the immediate buyer. See U.C.C. § 2-719 (2001) (allowing exclusion of liabil-
ity for consequential damages). In addition, a warrantor may be subject to an implied obligation of
indemnification arising when breach of its warranty causes the buyer to be liable to a third party.
Supra notes 90-97. Although the dissent in Central Washington Refrigeration, Inc., maintained that
the mere existence of a contract under the U.C.C. is sufficient to give rise to an implied right of
indemnification, Central Washington Refrigeration Inc. v. Barbee, 133 Wash. 2d 509, 522 n.5, 946
P.2d 760, 767 n.5 (1997), the majority held that the right arises where there is a defect in the goods
constituting a breach of an express or implied warranty. Id. at 516-17, 946 P.2d at 764. Accordingly,
if there is no warranty, there should be no basis for the implied indemnity claim since the buyer
obtained the performance for which it bargained. See Urban Dev., Inc., v. Evergreen Bldg. Prods.,
L.L.C., 114 Wash. App. 639, 646-47, 59 P.3d 112, 117 (2002) (no implied indemnity obligation
against subcontractors providing services based on implied warranty). Similarly, if the parties effec-
tively exclude any liability for consequential damages, including any damages for which the buyer
may be liable to a third party, the buyer should have no implied right of indemnification since the
contract negates that obligation. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 76, cmt. b (1937) (implied
right to indemnification subject to terms of parties' contract).
313. See supra text accompanying note 265.
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of such modifications or preparations is reflected in the retail value of the
goods, their inclusion in the claim against a remote seller might inappro-
priately increase the seller's damages for direct economic lOSS. 3 14
Significantly, both Lidstrand and Smith v. Behr Process Corp.315
hold that a remote purchaser can recover consequential damages for
breach of express or implied warranties by a remote supplier.316 The Lid-
strand decision is appropriate to the extent the buyers truly were third-
party beneficiaries of the remote seller's express warranty since the li-
ability for such damages would be undertaken by the seller, absent an
effective limitation of liability. More problematic is the result in Smith,
where remote buyers who did not appear to be third-party beneficiaries
recovered consequential damages. 3 " Recovery of consequential damages
is subject to the limitation in section 2-715(a) that a seller have reason to
know of any general or particular requirements or needs of the buyer at
the time of contracting. 318 Nevertheless, remote buyers have better in-
formation about such losses and are generally in a better position to take
measures to protect or insure against them than remote sellers are.3 19 Re-
quiring remote sellers to be responsible for such consequential losses is
inefficient. It causes remote buyers with higher consequential losses to
take fewer precautions or to underinsure against such losses and causes
buyers with lower losses to reduce the quantity of the goods pur-
chased.3 2 °
314. The difference in value is frequently measured by the cost of repair or replacement. See
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 14, § 10.2(a). To the extent a good is reparable, the value of modifi-
cations or preparation may not be reflected in the measure of damages since the only damages
should be the cost to repair. On the other hand, if the measure is the cost of replacement, the value of
such modifications and preparations may be included in the determination of damages but should be
excluded to base the buyer's damages on the implicit bargain with the remote seller. Cf id. (indicat-
ing that replacement value should be adjusted if a buyer is replacing a used good that has undergone
deterioration with a new good).
315. 113 Wash. App. 306, 345-46, 54 P.3d 665, 686 (2002).
316. In Kadiak, the manufacturer was held liable for consequential losses consisting of lost
profits and property loss suffered by a remote buyer of one of its motors when the motor caught fire,
delaying the buyer's fishing operations. On appeal, the manufacturer contested only the trial court's
instruction to the jury on loss profits, contending that the instruction allowed conjectural or specula-
tive damages by the jury, and not the award of consequential damages per se. See Kadiak Fisheries
Co. v. Murphy Diesel, Inc., 70 Wash. 2d 153, 167-68, 422 P.2d 496, 505 (1967).
317. 113 Wash. App. at 345-46, 54 P.3d at 686.
318. See CONSUMER PRODUCT WARRANTIES, supra note 203 § 8.03, at at 119 (remote seller
probably unaware of retail buyer's particular needs and requirements and may not know of general
requirements as well). The foreseeability limitation does not apply to consequential damages consist-
ing of injury to person or property. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) (2001).
319. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 31, at 427-28.
320. As indicated above, authority is divided on the question of whether a remote buyer can
revoke its acceptance of goods against a remote seller and recover the price. See supra note 249 and
accompanying text. In some instances, revocation may be a cost-minimizing remedy with the goods
being more valuable in the hands of the remote seller than they are in the hands of the buyer. See
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Finally, a seller to a remote buyer may have sold the goods to the
buyer either with no warranty or with a warranty less extensive than that
from the remote seller. In Daughtry, Justice Rosellini perceived the ab-
sence of a warranty by an immediate seller as a reason for allowing an
action by a remote buyer against a remote seller since the remote seller
might escape responsibility for its breach of warranty. 32 1 In fact, how-
ever, the absence of a warranty or a more restrictive warranty from an
immediate seller mandates that a remote buyer not have an action against
the remote seller.322 If there is no warranty in the contract between the
remote buyer and its seller, the remote buyer has not paid for any war-
ranty, unless the remote seller has either made a representation directly to
the remote buyer or has made a third-party beneficiary contract with its
immediate buyer. In other words, a warranty is not part of the bundle of
attributes for which the remote buyer paid when it purchased the good.323
Allowing a buyer to enforce a remote manufacturer's warranty in such
circumstances allows the remote buyer to obtain and enforce a better
bargain than that for which it paid and imposes inefficient liability on the
remote manufacturer.
If a buyer has no warranty from its seller and it is efficient for the
remote seller to be legally responsible to the remote buyer for the attrib-
utes of goods, the solution is for the remote seller to make an express
warranty to the remote buyer that the latter can enforce against the for-
mer. Indeed, in Tex Enterprises, Inc.,324 the court insightfully perceived
this express warranty solution as the appropriate response to the percep-
tion that the privity requirement allows remote sellers to escape respon-
325sibility for their goods and promotes circuitous litigation. 32 As the
Baughn326 case demonstrates, a remote seller can make an enforceable
express warranty, provided the buyer is aware of the representation prior
to entering into a contract to purchase the goods. Moreover, a remote
seller can make a remote buyer a third-party beneficiary of an express
warranty to its immediate buyer in a manner consistent with third-party
Priest, supra note 281. Nevertheless, section 2-608 refers to revocation with respect to a "seller."
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 14, § 8-4. Moreover, a remote seller does not receive the price from
a remote buyer, and that price, which may include subsequent modifications, is likely to be higher
than the price paid the remote seller.
321. Daughtry, 91 Wash. 2d at 718, 592 P.2d at 638.
322. Cf Reitz, supra note 16, at 398 (under proposed revision to section 2-318 remote buyer
who took goods from its seller with different terms from remote seller's warranty would not obtain
benefit of remote seller's warranty).
323. See Holdych & Mann, supra note 127, at 794-96 (discussing warranties as product attrib-
utes and the inclusion of those attributes in a product's price).
324. 149 Wash. 2d 204, 66 P.3d 625 (2003).
325. Id. at 213-14, 66 P.3d at 630.
326. 107 Wash. 2d at 151-52, 727 P.2d at 669.
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beneficiary principles. 3 7 Either a direct express warranty to a remote
buyer or a third-party beneficiary contract is a preferable solution to
problems emanating from the privity requirement since a remote seller's
express warranty can establish efficient limitations not only on the attrib-
utes being warranted but also on the remedies available for breach. 328
327. See supra text accompanying notes 62-66 and 100-101.
328. Other than the formation issues mentioned in the text, (see supra text accompanying notes
123-130) several objections exist to relying on remote sellers' express warranties to establish such
sellers' product quality obligations to remote buyers. The first is premised on the superior economic
bargaining or market power of remote sellers such as manufacturers. It is posited that such sellers
will use their superior power vis-6-vis remote buyers to provide inferior warranties, warranty dis-
claimers, and remedy limitations on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 87 (N.J. 1960). This argument is refuted by theoretical analysis demon-
strating that a seller with market power is better off selling a buyer terms for which the latter is will-
ing to pay so long as the price exceeds the seller's cost. See Coase, supra note 212, at 494. More-
over, empirical data show no correlation between warranty and remedy terms and market power.
Priest, supra note 30, at 1325.
The second objection is based not on sellers' bargaining power but on buyers' limited shopping
capacities. Given the large number of product attributes buyers confront in shopping for products
and comparing product attributes, buyers only shop for and price product attributes they consider
important, i.e., salient. Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Un-
conscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1216-44 (2003). Sellers will provide the salient terms that
buyers prefer, but sellers will include suboptimal non-salient terms to increase their profits at the
expense of unknowing buyers. Id at 1234-35. Although it is suggested that warranty terms and
remedy limitations are not salient contract terms, id. at 1238, that conclusion is questionable, particu-
larly with respect to the kinds of products that are likely to become the subject of lawsuits. Were
buyers not concerned about warranty terms, one would expect sellers to sell their products with no
warranties since the inclusion of a warranty imposes costs on a seller, at a minimum in processing
warranty claims. Yet in markets for comparatively expensive items, including consumer goods such
as mobile homes, automobiles, recreational vehicles, and appliances, warranties by both sellers and
third parties are quite common, if not ubiquitous. See Mann, supra note 216, at 27-32 (analyzing
dealer and third party warranties for used automobiles); Priest, supra note 30, at 1320-43 (compar-
ing warranties of 62 consumer products); George L. Priest, Special Statutes: The Structure and Op-
eration of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 246, 267-74 in KENNETH W. CLARKSON & TIMOTHY J.
MURIS, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION SINCE 1970: ECONOMIC REGULATION AND BUREAU-
CRATIC BEHAVIOR (1981) (analyzing the content of warranties for 43 consumer durable goods).
The third objection is based on studies in cognitive psychology, indicating that people do not
behave rationally and are affected by cognitive biases in decision making, which would include
selection of contract terms. See, e.g., John D. Cripps & Robert J. Meyer, Heuristics and Biases in
Timing the Replacement of Durable Products, 21 J. CONSUMER RES. 304 (1994); Melvin Aaron
Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995); Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Reality of Cognitive Illusions, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 582 (1996);
Philip M. Kinkaid & William J. Stuntz, Enforcing Waivers in Products Liability, 69 VA L. REV.
1111 (1983); Korobkin, supra; Jakob Brochner Madsen, Test of Rationality Versus an "Over Opti-
mist" Bias, 15 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 587 (1994); Peter C. Mayer, Electricity Conservation: Consumer
Rationality Versus Prospect Theory, CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y, April 1995, at 109; Amos Tversky &
Daniel E. Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in DANIEL E. KAHNE-
MAN ET AL., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (1982). According to this
objection, warranty disclaimers are not suboptimal because markets fail to respond to buyers' prefer-
ences. Rather, because buyers are affected by biases and rely on heuristics (rules of thumb) in decid-
ing whether to accept sellers' warranty terms, they may underestimate the probability or cost of
product failure and therefore accept disclaimers when it is not optimal to do so. See Holdych &
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VI. CONCLUSION
With the exception of some decisions applying a third-party benefi-
ciary analysis to express and implied warranties to immediate purchas-
ers,329 Washington cases have adhered to a privity of contract require-
ment consistent with the analysis in this article. In Tex Enterprises, Inc.,
the Washington Supreme Court appropriately refused to abrogate the
privity requirement for an implied warranty of merchantability or fitness
for purpose when a remote seller makes an express representation about
a good to a remote buyer. 330 Had the court allowed a buyer to make an
implied warranty claim in such a circumstance, its decision would
probably have produced an anomalous result. A remote buyer who does
not learn of a remote seller's representation prior to purchase, or to
whom a remote seller does not make a representation made to other buy-
ers, would not have been able to enforce an implied warranty against the
remote seller, 331 whereas a remote buyer who knew of the representation
could have done so. The result would have been anomalous at least with
respect to the implied warranty of merchantability since that warranty is
based on a seller's being a merchant with respect to goods of that kind
332
and not on a seller's representations about the qualities or attributes of
the goods.333 Moreover, under the comparative advantage theory of war-
ranties, a seller will not disclaim an implied warranty of merchantability
if a buyer values the attributes of merchantability more than the cost of
providing them or of insuring against losses resulting from their absence
Ferrell, supra note 6, at 260-65. Although some of the biases and heuristics found in the literature
suggest such underestimation might take place, there is also scholarship questioning the pervasive-
ness and uniformity of the conclusions from this literature. See Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and
Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal
Incompetence, 91 GEO. L. J. 67 (2002); Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The
Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of the Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907
(2002). Among other things, people are less likely to use heuristics but rather engage in systematic
processing of information when making a high involvement decision, i.e., one that has a relatively
high degree of importance or significance. Kazuhisa Takemura, Personal Involvement, Task Com-
plexity and the Decision Making Process: An Information Search Analysis in 36 JAPANESE PSY-
CHOL. RES. 41, 44-45 (1994). As indicated previously, most situations in which a warranty is legally
significant involve items such as mobile homes, automobiles, boats, etc., where substantial potential
economic loss is involved. For transactions involving such items, one might anticipate more system-
atic and less biased processing of information than for low-priced, less significant goods.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 67-86 and 154-161.
330. 149 Wash. 2d at 211-13, 66 P.3d at 629.
331. The former buyer might have been precluded because the creation of an express warranty
requires that a representation was the basis of the bargain between the parties, which mandates that a
buyer knew of a representation prior to purchase. See Baughn v. Honda Motor Co. Ltd., 107 Wash.
2d 127, 151-52, 727 P.2d 655, 669 (1986).
332. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (2001).
333. The character of the implied warranty does, of course, depend on a seller's description of
the good. See id. § 2-314(2)(a); supra notes 306-307 and accompanying text.
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and the seller can provide the attributes or insure against their absence
more cheaply than the buyer can.334 Whether an implied warranty of
merchantability satisfies these criteria does not depend on express repre-
sentations about a good's attributes.
More importantly, a contrary decision by the court would have in-
creased the cost to remote sellers of making representations that consti-
tute express warranties. 335 This would cause express, bargained-for terms
to be less attractive. Yet, as the court's opinion correctly indicates, the
ability of remote buyers to sue remote sellers for breach of express repre-
sentations made to them alleviates the problems both of remote sellers
not being responsible for the quality of their goods and circuitous litiga-
336tion.
Despite the Washington Supreme Court's perception of the utility
in enforcing express warranties and its generally correct decisions on
privity issues, some decisions by Washington courts, treating remote
buyers as third-party beneficiaries of representations made to immediate
buyers, increase the costs of making express warranties.337 The courts
failed to inquire whether an express warranty for a period of time might
have been for the benefit of an immediate purchaser to protect it from
product nonconformity claims by its buyer. Instead, the courts concluded
that a warranty for a period of time is a third-party beneficiary contract if
the immediate buyer does not possess the goods during the warranty pe-
riod, a conclusion that is not necessarily correct.338 Finally, the courts
appeared to treat as a third-party beneficiary the promisee to whom an
express warranty is made.339
The decisions allowing remote buyers to sue remote sellers as third-
party beneficiaries of implied warranties are even more difficult to jus-
tify. These decisions are difficult to reconcile with contract law and do
not establish determinate criteria for deciding whether a remote buyer is
a third-party beneficiary. Furthermore, they increase the cost of implied
warranties both through the potential increased costs of disclaiming the
warranties or limiting liability and through the expanded liability to re-
mote purchasers, particularly in the form of consequential damages.34 °
334. See supra text accompanying note 32.
335. See supra text accompanying notes 207-210.
336. Tex Enterprises, Inc. v. Brockway Standard, Inc., 149 Wash. 2d 204, 213-14, 66 P.3d
625, 630 (2003).
337. See supra text accompanying notes 288-298 and 312-320.
338. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 99-104.
340. See supra text accompanying notes 315-319.
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Part of the solution 34 1 to the perceived problems with the privity re-
quirement is that recognized by the court in Tex Enterprises, Inc.: the
enforcement of express warranties by remote sellers to remote buyers.
The difficulty with the solution, however, is the basis of the bargain test
articulated in Baughn, which appears to require a buyer to be aware of a
remote seller's representation prior to purchase.34 z Adoption of new
U.C.C. section 2-313A would provide a solution for those affirmations,
descriptions, or promises since the section does not require that remote
buyers be aware of remote seller representations prior to purchase. Thus,
the remote buyers could enforce the apparent pass-through warranties in
Schroeder and Flaegol without a court having to invoke a third-party
beneficiary analysis. Unfortunately, new section 2-313B, which governs
remote seller representations made to the public, continues the knowl-
edge requirement and hinders remote sellers' creation of enforceable ob-
ligations in remote buyers.343 Thus, if that section were adopted, remote
buyers would have to be aware of representations not packaged with or
otherwise accompanied by the goods to enforce them against remote
sellers. Whether new section 2-313B is adopted or the previous section
2-313 is retained, the ex ante knowledge requirement should be elimi-
nated to facilitate the creation of express warranties in a manner more
consistent with the way in which such warranties are generated in mar-
kets for goods.344
341. The other solution is for remote sellers to make remote buyers third-party beneficiaries of
express warranties given to their immediate buyers. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
342. See 107 Wash. 2d at 151-52, 727 P.2d at 669.
343. There is also a question whether the amendments cover nonpublic, private representations.
See supra note 199.
344. See Holdych & Mann, supra note 127.
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